Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1069-1081 (2013)

Robert A. Mabrito
North Carolina State University
Some contemporary philosophers have argued that expressivism or non-cognitivism, if suitably developed, can solve the well-known Frege–Geach problem. Of course, whether this is true is a matter of debate. Recently, Cian Dorr has advanced an argument that, if successful, would show that this debate is unimportant. For, according to Dorr, a solution to the Frege–Geach problem will not save expressivism from a new and distinct problem, namely that an expressivist theory—even assuming a solution to the Frege–Geach problem—entails that intuitively rational beliefs are in fact irrational. If Dorr is correct about this, then the new problem he raises would be as devastating as the old Frege–Geach problem is often thought to be. I will argue that Dorr is not correct. Rather than constituting a new and potent objection, the issue Dorr raises—at least absent further argument—does not pose a threat to any expressivist theory which is able to solve the Frege–Geach problem and is otherwise acceptable
Keywords Dorr  Expressivism  Non-cognitivism  Wishful thinking
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-0003-8
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References found in this work BETA

Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2003 - Harvard University Press.
Essays in Quasi-Realism.Simon Blackburn - 1993 - Oxford University Press.

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