Erkenntnis 81 (4):853-880 (2016)

Authors
Erich Rast
New University of Lisbon
Abstract
In this article, monist values are expressed as preferences like in economics and decision making. On the basis of this formalization, various ways of defining value disagreement of agents within a group are investigated. Twelve notions of categorical value disagreement are laid out. Since these are too coarse-grained for many purposes, known distance-based approaches like Kendall’s Tau and Spearman’s footrule are generalized from linear orders to preorders and position-sensitive variants are developed. The account is further generalized to allow for agents with incomplete information. The article ends with a discussion of known limitations of preference-based accounts of values and how these might be overcome by accounting for parity and essential incompleteness. It is also shown that one intuitively compelling notion of disagreement does not give rise to a proper distance measure.
Keywords preferences  disagreement  distance measures  permutations  value theory  formal axiology  parity  utility  perspectivity
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s10670-015-9772-8
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 65,784
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Morality of Freedom.Joseph Raz - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
Truth Without Objectivity.Max Kölbel - 2002 - London and New York: Routledge.

View all 30 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Hyperintensionality and Normativity.Federico L. G. Faroldi - 2019 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag.
Perspectival Disagreement.Erich H. Rast - 2018 - Theoria 84 (2):120-139.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Disagreement Without Error.Torfinn Thomesen Huvenes - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S1):143-154.
Trading in Values: Disagreement and Rationality in Teaching.Kristin Schaupp - 2015 - American Association of Philosophy Teachers Studies in Pedagogy 1:111-128.
Disagreement.Graham Oppy - 2010 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 68 (1-3):183-199.
Towards a Unified Notion of Disagreement.Delia Belleri & Michele Palmira - 2013 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 88 (1):139-159.
Moral Disagreement Among Philosophers.Ralph Wedgwood - 2014 - In Michael Bergmann & Patrick Kain (eds.), Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Disagreement and Evolution. Oxford University Press. pp. 23-39.
Disagreement and Epistemic Peers.Jonathan Matheson - 2015 - Oxford Handbooks Online.
Possible Disagreements and Defeat.Brandon Carey - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (3):371-381.
The Pragmatics of Normative Disagreement.Stephen Finlay - 2014 - In Guy Fletcher & Michael Ridge (eds.), Having It Both Ways: Hybrid Theories and Modern Metaethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 124-148.
An Alternative to Relativism.John K. Davis - 2010 - Philosophical Topics 38 (2):17-37.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2015-10-01

Total views
49 ( #222,764 of 2,463,134 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #223,428 of 2,463,134 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes