An Epistemically Modest Response to Disagreement, AGM-ified

The Reasoner 9 (9):76-77 (2015)
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Abstract

In this short paper, I show that AGM belief contraction is appropriate for modeling an epistemically modest response to a disagreement with an epistemic peer.

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Lee Elkin
Erasmus University Rotterdam

Citations of this work

Unanimous Consensus Against AGM?Rush T. Stewart - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (4):222-231.

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