Results for 'preferences'

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  1.  8
    Preference, Value, Choice, and Welfare.Daniel M. Hausman - 2011 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book is about preferences, principally as they figure in economics. It also explores their uses in everyday language and action, how they are understood in psychology and how they figure in philosophical reflection on action and morality. The book clarifies and for the most part defends the way in which economists invoke preferences to explain, predict and assess behavior and outcomes. Hausman argues, however, that the predictions and explanations economists offer rely on theories of preference formation that (...)
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  2.  75
    Extended Preferences and Interpersonal Comparisons of Well‐Being.Hilary Greaves & Harvey Lederman - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (3):636-667.
    An important objection to preference-satisfaction theories of well-being is that these theories cannot make sense of interpersonal comparisons of well-being. A tradition dating back to Harsanyi () attempts to respond to this objection by appeal to so-called extended preferences: very roughly, preferences over situations whose description includes agents’ preferences. This paper examines the prospects for defending the preference-satisfaction theory via this extended preferences program. We argue that making conceptual sense of extended preferences is less problematic (...)
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  3.  48
    Preferences.Christoph Fehige & Ulla Wessels (eds.) - 1998 - De Gruyter.
    Abstracts These are abstracts of the papers that receive a reply, not of the replies themselves. The abstracts appear in the alphabetical order of the authors' names; for the contributions to the ...
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  4.  81
    On Preferring.Kyle Blumberg - forthcoming - Linguistics and Philosophy:1-30.
    In this paper, I draw attention to comparative preference claims, i.e. sentences of the form 'S prefers p to q'. I show that preference claims exhibit interesting patterns, and try to develop a semantics that captures them. Then I use my account of preference to provide an analysis of desire. The resulting entry for desire ascriptions is independently motivated, and finds support from a wide range of phenomena.
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  5. The Construction of Preference.Sarah Lichtenstein & Paul Slovic (eds.) - 2006 - Cambridge University Press.
    One of the main themes that has emerged from behavioral decision research during the past three decades is the view that people's preferences are often constructed in the process of elicitation. This idea is derived from studies demonstrating that normatively equivalent methods of elicitation (e.g., choice and pricing) give rise to systematically different responses. These preference reversals violate the principle of procedure invariance that is fundamental to all theories of rational choice. If different elicitation procedures produce different orderings of (...)
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  6. Preference and Obligation.Sven Danielsson - 1969 - Uppsala, Filosofiska Föreningen.
  7. Is It Bad to Prefer Attractive Partners?William D'alessandro - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association:1-20.
    Philosophers have rightly condemned lookism—that is, discrimination in favor of attractive people or against unattractive people—in education, the justice system, the workplace and elsewhere. Surprisingly, however, the almost universal preference for attractive romantic and sexual partners has rarely received serious ethical scrutiny. On its face, it’s unclear whether this is a form of discrimination we should reject or tolerate. I consider arguments for both views. On the one hand, a strong case can be made that preferring attractive partners is bad. (...)
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  8.  2
    Preferences and Well-Being.Serena Olsaretti (ed.) - 2006 - Cambridge University Press.
    Preferences are often thought to be relevant for well-being: respecting preferences, or satisfying them, contributes in some way to making people's lives go well for them. A crucial assumption that accompanies this conviction is that there is a normative standard that allows us to discriminate between preferences that do, and those that do not, contribute to well-being. The papers collected in this volume, written by moral philosophers and philosophers of economics, explore a number of central issues concerning (...)
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  9. A Preference Semantics for Imperatives.William B. Starr - 2020 - Semantics and Pragmatics 20.
    Imperative sentences like Dance! do not seem to represent the world. Recent modal analyses challenge this idea, but its intuitive and historical appeal remain strong. This paper presents three new challenges for a non-representational analysis, showing that the obstacles facing it are even steeper than previously appreciated. I will argue that the only way for the non-representationalist to meet these three challenges is to adopt a dynamic semantics. Such a dynamic semantics is proposed here: imperatives introduce preferences between alternatives. (...)
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  10.  19
    Preference‐Conditioned Necessities: Detachment and Practical Reasoning.Sven Lauer & Cleo Condoravdi - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (4):584-621.
    This article is about conditionalized modal statements whose antecedents concern a preferential attitude of an agent. The focus is on anankastic conditionals or, as they are known in the philosophical literature, hypothetical imperatives. We present a linguistically-motivated analysis of anankastic and related conditionals and use it to address challenges for semantic theories of natural language conditionals motivated by certain philosophical concerns about practical reasoning and the requirements of rationality.
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  11.  98
    Adaptive Preferences: Merging Political Accounts and Well-Being Accounts.Rosa Terlazzo - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (2):179-196.
    Accounts of adaptive preferences are of two kinds: well-being accounts fully theorized for their own sake and political accounts theorized to facilitate the political project of reducing oppression and marginalization. Given their practical role, the latter are often less fully theorized, and are therefore less robust to theoretical criticism. In this paper, I first draw on well-being accounts to identify the well-theorized elements that political accounts should want to adopt in order to strengthen their project and avoid common criticisms. (...)
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  12.  3
    Pleasure, Preference and Value: Studies in Philosophical Aesthetics.Eva Schaper - 1983 - Cambridge University Press.
    Philosophical aesthetics is an area in which many strands of contemporary philosophical thinking meet. The contributors to this volume are aware of the wider logical, epistemological, moral and metaphysical implications raised by conceptual problems specific to aesthetics. Three themes recur and are taken up from different angles in several of the papers: pleasure – its nature and role in the experience of art and beauty; preference – figuring prominently in aesthetic appraising, appreciating and judging; and value – aesthetic value in (...)
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  13.  3
    How Revealed Preference Theory Can Be Explanatory.Travis Holmes - 2022 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 91:20-27.
    The question of how to frame agential preferences in economics finds one caught between Scylla and Charybdis. If preferences are framed in as minimal and deflationary a manner as revealed preference theory recommends, the theory falls prey to objections about its predictiveness and explanatory power. Alternatively, if too many cognitive and causal intricacies are incorporated into the preference concept, revealed preference models will violate pragmatic norms of model construction, surrendering model simplicity and generality. This paper charts a middle (...)
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  14. Beyond Adaptive Preferences: Rethinking Women's Complicity in Their Own Subordination.Charlotte Knowles - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
    An important question confronting feminist philosophers is why women are sometimes complicit in their own subordination. The dominant view holds that complicity is best understood in terms of adaptive preferences. This view assumes that agents will naturally gravitate away from subordination and towards flourishing, as long as they do not have things imposed on them that disrupt this trajectory. However, there is reason to believe that ‘impositions’ do not explain all of the ways in which complicity can arise. This (...)
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  15. Preference Change: Approaches From Philosophy, Economics and Psychology.Till Grüne-Yanoff & Sven Ove Hansson - 2009 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.
    Changing preferencesis a phenomenonoften invoked but rarely properlyaccounted for. Throughout the history of the social sciences, researchers have come against the possibility that their subjects’ preferenceswere affected by the phenomenato be explainedor by otherfactorsnot taken into accountin the explanation.Sporadically, attempts have been made to systematically investigate these in uences, but none of these seems to have had a lasting impact. Today we are still not much further with respect to preference change than we were at the middle of the last (...)
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  16.  63
    Aggregating Extended Preferences.Hilary Greaves & Harvey Lederman - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (5):1163-1190.
    An important objection to preference-satisfaction theories of well-being is that they cannot make sense of interpersonal comparisons. A tradition dating back to Harsanyi :434, 1953) attempts to solve this problem by appeal to people’s so-called extended preferences. This paper presents a new problem for the extended preferences program, related to Arrow’s celebrated impossibility theorem. We consider three ways in which the extended-preference theorist might avoid this problem, and recommend that she pursue one: developing aggregation rules that violate Arrow’s (...)
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  17. Preferences and Positivist Methodology in Economics.Christopher Clarke - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (2):192-212.
    I distinguish several doctrines that economic methodologists have found attractive, all of which have a positivist flavour. One of these is the doctrine that preference assignments in economics are just shorthand descriptions of agents' choice behaviour. Although most of these doctrines are problematic, the latter doctrine about preference assignments is a respectable one, I argue. It doesn't entail any of the problematic doctrines, and indeed it is warranted independently of them.
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  18.  30
    Preferences and Reasons for Communicating Probabilistic Information in Verbal or Numerical Terms.Thomas S. Wallsten, David V. Budescu, Rami Zwick & Steven M. Kemp - 1993 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 31 (2):135-138.
  19.  18
    Aesthetic Preference and Syntactic Prototypicality in Music: 'Tis the Gift to Be Simple.J. David Smith & Robert J. Melara - 1990 - Cognition 34 (3):279-298.
  20.  29
    Pleasure, Preference and Value: Studies in Philosophical Aesthetics.Schaper Eva (ed.) - 1983 - Cambridge University Press.
    Philosophical aesthetics is an area in which many strands of contemporary philosophical thinking meet. The contributors to this volume are aware of the wider logical, epistemological, moral and metaphysical implications raised by conceptual problems specific to aesthetics. Three themes recur and are taken up from different angles in several of the papers: pleasure – its nature and role in the experience of art and beauty; preference – figuring prominently in aesthetic appraising, appreciating and judging; and value – aesthetic value in (...)
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  21. Preferring a Genetically-Related Child.Tina Rulli - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (6):669-698.
    _ Source: _Page Count 30 Millions of children worldwide could benefit from adoption. One could argue that prospective parents have a pro tanto duty to adopt rather than create children. For the sake of argument, I assume there is such a duty and focus on a pressing objection to it. Prospective parents may prefer that their children are genetically related to them. I examine eight reasons prospective parents have for preferring genetic children: for parent-child physical resemblance, for family resemblance, for (...)
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  22.  69
    Adaptive Preferences and Women’s Empowerment.Serene J. Khader - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
  23.  14
    Preference for Well-Balanced Saliency in Details Cropped From Photographs.Jonas Abeln, Leonie Fresz, Seyed Ali Amirshahi, I. Chris McManus, Michael Koch, Helene Kreysa & Christoph Redies - 2015 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 9.
  24. On Preferring That Overall, Things Are Worse: Future‐Bias and Unequal Payoffs.Preston Greene, Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller & James Norton - 2021 - Wiley: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Philosophers working on time-biases assume that people are hedonically biased toward the future. A hedonically future-biased agent prefers pleasurable experiences to be future instead of past, and painful experiences to be past instead of future. Philosophers further predict that this bias is strong enough to apply to unequal payoffs: people often prefer less pleasurable future experiences to more pleasurable past ones, and more painful past experiences to less painful future ones. In addition, philosophers have predicted that future-bias is restricted to (...)
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  25.  94
    On Sense and Preference.James Fanciullo - forthcoming - Journal of Moral Philosophy:1-23.
    Determining the precise nature of the connection between preference, choice, and welfare has arguably been the central project in the field of welfare economics, which aims to offer a proper guide for economists in making policy decisions that affect people’s welfare. The two leading approaches here historically—the revealed preference and latent preference approaches—seem equally incapable of so guiding economists. I argue that the deadlock here owes to welfare economists’ failure to recognize a crucial distinction between two senses of “preference.” I (...)
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  26.  2
    What Preferences for Behavioral Welfare Economics?Till Grüne-Yanoff - forthcoming - Tandf: Journal of Economic Methodology:1-13.
  27. Adaptive Preference.H. Baber - 2007 - Social Theory and Practice 33 (1):105-126.
    I argue, first, that the deprived individuals whose predicaments Nussbaum cites as examples of "adaptive preference" do not in fact prefer the conditions of their lives to what we should regard as more desirable alternatives, indeed that we believe they are badly off precisely because they are not living the lives they would prefer to live if they had other options and were aware of them. Secondly, I argue that even where individuals in deprived circumstances acquire tastes for conditions that (...)
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  28.  30
    Preferences: Neither Behavioural nor Mental.Francesco Guala - 2019 - Economics and Philosophy 35 (3):383-401.
    Recent debates on the nature of preferences in economics have typically assumed that they are to be interpreted either as behavioural regularities or as mental states. In this paper I challenge this dichotomy and argue that neither interpretation is consistent with scientific practice in choice theory and behavioural economics. Preferences are belief-dependent dispositions with a multiply realizable causal basis, which explains why economists are reluctant to make a commitment about their interpretation.
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  29.  4
    Choice without Preference.Nicholas Rescher - 1959 - Kant-Studien 51 (1-4):142.
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  30.  43
    Patient Preference Predictors and the Problem of Naked Statistical Evidence.Nathaniel Paul Sharadin - 2018 - Journal of Medical Ethics 44 (12):857-862.
    Patient preference predictors (PPPs) promise to provide medical professionals with a new solution to the problem of making treatment decisions on behalf of incapacitated patients. I show that the use of PPPs faces a version of a normative problem familiar from legal scholarship: the problem of naked statistical evidence. I sketch two sorts of possible reply, vindicating and debunking, and suggest that our reply to the problem in the one domain ought to mirror our reply in the other. The conclusion (...)
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  31. The Preference for the Primitive Episodes in the History of Western Taste and Art.E. H. Gombrich - 2002
     
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  32. Conditional Preferences and Practical Conditionals.Nate Charlow - 2013 - Linguistics and Philosophy 36 (6):463-511.
    I argue that taking the Practical Conditionals Thesis seriously demands a new understanding of the semantics of such conditionals. Practical Conditionals Thesis: A practical conditional [if A][ought] expresses B’s conditional preferability given A Paul Weirich has argued that the conditional utility of a state of affairs B on A is to be identified as the degree to which it is desired under indicative supposition that A. Similarly, exploiting the PCT, I will argue that the proper analysis of indicative practical conditionals (...)
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  33. Team Preferences.Robert Sugden - 2000 - Economics and Philosophy 16 (2):175-204.
    When my family discusses how we should spend a summer holiday, we start from certain common understandings about our preferences. We prefer self-catering accommodation to hotels, and hotels to campsites. We prefer walking and looking at scenery and wildlife to big-city sightseeing and shopping. When it comes to walks, we prefer walks of six miles or so to ones which are much shorter or much longer, and prefer well-marked but uncrowded paths to ones which are either more rugged or (...)
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  34. Preference and Urgency.T. M. Scanlon - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):655-669.
  35.  35
    Preference Purification and the Inner Rational Agent: A Critique of the Conventional Wisdom of Behavioural Welfare Economics.Gerardo Infante, Guilhem Lecouteux & Robert Sugden - 2016 - Journal of Economic Methodology 23 (1):1-25.
    Neoclassical economics assumes that individuals have stable and context-independent preferences, and uses preference satisfaction as a normative criterion. By calling this assumption into question, behavioural findings cause fundamental problems for normative economics. A common response to these problems is to treat deviations from conventional rational choice theory as mistakes, and to try to reconstruct the preferences that individuals would have acted on, had they reasoned correctly. We argue that this preference purification approach implicitly uses a dualistic model of (...)
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  36.  1
    What Preferences for Behavioral Welfare Economics?Till Grüne-Yanoff - forthcoming - Journal of Economic Methodology:1-13.
    Behavioral welfare economics assigns different roles to preferences than either non-behavioral forms of welfare economics or theories outside of the domain of welfare economics. In particular...
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  37. Rational Preference: Decision Theory as a Theory of Practical Rationality.James Dreier - 1996 - Theory and Decision 40 (3):249-276.
    In general, the technical apparatus of decision theory is well developed. It has loads of theorems, and they can be proved from axioms. Many of the theorems are interesting, and useful both from a philosophical and a practical perspective. But decision theory does not have a well agreed upon interpretation. Its technical terms, in particular, ‘utility’ and ‘preference’ do not have a single clear and uncontroversial meaning. How to interpret these terms depends, of course, on what purposes in pursuit of (...)
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  38.  86
    Value-Preference Symmetry and Fitting-Attitude Accounts of Value Relations.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (252):476-491.
    Joshua Gert and Wlodek Rabinowicz have developed frameworks for value relations that are rich enough to allow for non-standard value relations such as parity. Yet their frameworks do not allow for any non-standard preference relations. In this paper, I shall defend a symmetry between values and preferences, namely, that for every value relation, there is a corresponding preference relation, and vice versa. I claim that if the arguments that there are non-standard value relations are cogent, these arguments, mutatis mutandis, (...)
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  39.  11
    Opportunity and Preference Learning.Christian Schubert - 2015 - Economics and Philosophy 31 (2):275-295.
    :Robert Sugden has suggested a normative standard of freedom as ‘opportunity’ that is supposed to help realign normative economics – with its traditional rational choice orientation – with behavioural economics. While allowing preferences to be incoherent, he wants to maintain the anti-paternalist stance of orthodox welfare economics. His standard, though, presupposes that people respond to uncertainty about their own future preferences by dismissing any kind of self-constraint. We argue that the approach lacks psychological substance: Sugden's normative benchmark – (...)
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  40. Social Preference Under Twofold Uncertainty.Philippe Mongin & Marcus Pivato - forthcoming - Economic Theory.
    We investigate the conflict between the ex ante and ex post criteria of social welfare in a new framework of individual and social decisions, which distinguishes between two sources of uncertainty, here interpreted as an objective and a subjective source respectively. This framework makes it possible to endow the individuals and society not only with ex ante and ex post preferences, as is usually done, but also with interim preferences of two kinds, and correspondingly, to introduce interim forms (...)
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  41.  36
    What Preferences Really Are.Erik Angner - 2018 - Philosophy of Science 85 (4):660-681.
    Daniel M. Hausman holds that preferences in economics are total subjective comparative evaluations—subjective judgments to the effect that something is better than something else all things told—and that economists are right to employ this conception of preference. Here, I argue against both parts of Hausman’s thesis. The failure of Hausman’s account, I continue, reflects a deeper problem, that is, that preferences in economics do not need an explicit definition of the kind that he seeks. Nonetheless, Hausman’s labors were (...)
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  42.  5
    Patients' Preferences for Distributing Limited Government‐Funded IVF Cycles.Claire Ann Jones, Tamas Gotz, Nipa Chauhan, Sydney Goldstein & Angela Assal - 2022 - Wiley: Bioethics 36 (4):388-402.
    Bioethics, Volume 36, Issue 4, Page 388-402, May 2022.
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  43.  55
    Practical Rationality and Preference: Essays for David Gauthier.Christopher W. Morris & Arthur Ripstein (eds.) - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.
    What are preferences and are they reasons for action? Is it rational to cooperate with others even if that entails acting against one's preferences? The dominant position in philosophy on the topic of practical rationality is that one acts so as to maximize the satisfaction of one's preferences. This view is most closely associated with the work of David Gauthier, and in this collection of essays some of the most innovative philosophers working in this field explore the (...)
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  44.  2
    Preference, Production and Capital: Selected Papers of Hirofumi Uzawa.Hirofumi Uzawa & Kenneth J. Arrow - 1989 - Cambridge University Press.
    This volume contains a selection of Professor Uzawa's important contributions to mathematical economics. Subjects covered by these nineteen essays include consumption, production, equilibrium, capital, growth, planning, international trade, and the theory of social overhead capital. Written in the 1960s and early 1970s, the papers form a basis upon which economic theory has developed over the last twenty years. The collection includes some of Uzawa's classic contributions, such as 'Preference and Rational Choice in the Theory of Consumption', 'Time Preference, the Consumption (...)
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  45. Preference Satisfaction and Welfare Economics: Daniel M. Hausman and Michael S. McPherson.Daniel M. Hausman - 2009 - Economics and Philosophy 25 (1):1-25.
    The tenuous claims of cost-benefit analysis to guide policy so as to promote welfare turn on measuring welfare by preference satisfaction and taking willingness-to-pay to indicate preferences. Yet it is obvious that people's preferences are not always self-interested and that false beliefs may lead people to prefer what is worse for them even when people are self-interested. So welfare is not preference satisfaction, and hence it appears that cost-benefit analysis and welfare economics in general rely on a mistaken (...)
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  46. Preference Change: Approaches From Philosophy, Economics and Psychology.Mats J. Hansson & Till Grüne-Yanoff (eds.) - 2008 - Springer, Theory and Decision Library A.
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  47. Preference Logic, Conditionals and Solution Concepts in Games.Johan van Benthem - unknown
    Preference is a basic notion in human behaviour, underlying such varied phenomena as individual rationality in the philosophy of action and game theory, obligations in deontic logic (we should aim for the best of all possible worlds), or collective decisions in social choice theory. Also, in a more abstract sense, preference orderings are used in conditional logic or non-monotonic reasoning as a way of arranging worlds into more or less plausible ones. The field of preference logic (cf. Hansson [10]) studies (...)
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  48.  5
    Reasoning About Preference Dynamics.Fenrong Liu - 2011 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer Verlag.
    Our preferences determine how we act and think, but exactly what the mechanics are and how they work is a central cause of concern in many disciplines. This book uses techniques from modern logics of information flow and action to develop a unified new theory of what preference is and how it changes. The theory emphasizes reasons for preference, as well as its entanglement with our beliefs. Moreover, the book provides dynamic logical systems which describe the explicit triggers driving (...)
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  49.  79
    Adaptive Preferences, Adapted Preferences.Polly Mitchell - 2018 - Mind 127 (508):1003-1025.
    People who have not experienced diseases and health conditions tend to judge them to be worse than they are reported to be by people who have experienced them. This phenomenon, known as the disability paradox, presents a challenge for health policy, and in particular, healthcare resource distribution. This divergence between patient and public preferences is most plausibly explained as a result of hedonic adaptation, a widespread phenomenon in which people tend to adapt fairly quickly to the state they are (...)
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  50.  27
    Preferring a Genetically-Related Child.Tina Rulli - 2016 - New Content is Available for Journal of Moral Philosophy 13:669-698.
    Millions of children worldwide could benefit from adoption. One could argue that prospective parents have a pro tanto duty to adopt rather than create children. For the sake of argument, I assume there is such a duty and focus on a pressing objection to it. Prospective parents may prefer that their children are genetically related to them. I examine eight reasons prospective parents have for preferring genetic children: for parent-child physical resemblance, for family resemblance, for psychological similarity, for the sake (...)
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