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  1. Being Realist about Bayes, and the Predictive Processing Theory of Mind.Matteo Colombo, Lee Elkin & Stephan Hartmann - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (1):185-220.
    Some naturalistic philosophers of mind subscribing to the predictive processing theory of mind have adopted a realist attitude towards the results of Bayesian cognitive science. In this paper, we argue that this realist attitude is unwarranted. The Bayesian research program in cognitive science does not possess special epistemic virtues over alternative approaches for explaining mental phenomena involving uncertainty. In particular, the Bayesian approach is not simpler, more unifying, or more rational than alternatives. It is also contentious that the Bayesian approach (...)
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  2. Resolving Peer Disagreements Through Imprecise Probabilities.Lee Elkin & Gregory Wheeler - 2018 - Noûs 52 (2):260-278.
    Two compelling principles, the Reasonable Range Principle and the Preservation of Irrelevant Evidence Principle, are necessary conditions that any response to peer disagreements ought to abide by. The Reasonable Range Principle maintains that a resolution to a peer disagreement should not fall outside the range of views expressed by the peers in their dispute, whereas the Preservation of Irrelevant Evidence Principle maintains that a resolution strategy should be able to preserve unanimous judgments of evidential irrelevance among the peers. No standard (...)
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    Opinion Pooling.Lee Elkin & Richard Pettigrew - 2024 - Cambridge University Press. Edited by Richard Pettigrew.
    Disagreement is a common feature of a social world. For various reasons, however, we sometimes need to resolve a disagreement into a single set of opinions. This can be achieved by pooling the opinions of individuals that make up the group. This Element provides an opinionated survey on some ways of pooling opinions: linear pooling, multiplicative pooling (including geometric), and pooling through imprecise probabilities. While this Element gives significant attention to the axiomatic approach in evaluating pooling strategies, it also evaluates (...)
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    Normative Uncertainty Meets Voting Theory.Lee Elkin - 2024 - Synthese 203 (6):1-14.
    Recent attempts to provide a viable account of decision making under normative uncertainty through the use of voting procedures seem promising, but incomparable options pose a challenge. This paper focuses on the so-called Borda approach to decision making under normative uncertainty (MacAskill, Mind 125(500):967–1004, 2016 ; MacAskill et al., Moral uncertainty, Oxford University Press, 2020 ) and illustrates how an extended version of it aimed at accommodating incomplete preference orderings associated with normative theories fails. I propose a different account for (...)
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    An Epistemically Modest Response to Disagreement, AGM-ified.Lee Elkin - 2015 - The Reasoner 9 (9):76-77.
    In this short paper, I show that AGM belief contraction is appropriate for modeling an epistemically modest response to a disagreement with an epistemic peer.
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  6. Regret Averse Opinion Aggregation.Lee Elkin - 2021 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8 (16):473-495.
    It is often suggested that when opinions differ among individuals in a group, the opinions should be aggregated to form a compromise. This paper compares two approaches to aggregating opinions, linear pooling and what I call opinion agglomeration. In evaluating both strategies, I propose a pragmatic criterion, No Regrets, entailing that an aggregation strategy should prevent groups from buying and selling bets on events at prices regretted by their members. I show that only opinion agglomeration is able to satisfy the (...)
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  7.  50
    The Precautionary Principle and Expert Disagreement.Lee Elkin - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (6):2717-2726.
    The Precautionary Principle is typically construed as a conservative decision rule aimed at preventing harm. But Martin Peterson (JME 33: 5–10, 2007; The ethics of technology: A geometric analysis of five moral principles, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017) has argued that the principle is better understood as an epistemic rule, guiding decision-makers in forming beliefs rather than choosing among possible acts. On the epistemic view, he claims there is a principle concerning expert disagreement underlying precautionary-based reasoning called the ecumenical principle: (...)
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  8. Too Rational: How Predictive Coding’s Success Risks Harming the Mentally Disordered and Ill.Lee Elkin & Karolina Wiśniowska - 2022 - Journal of Neurophilosophy 1 (1).
    The so-called predictive coding or predictive processing theory of mind has attracted significant attention in the brain and behavioral sciences over the past couple of decades. We aim to discuss an important ethical implication of the theory’s success. As predictive coding has become influential in the study of mental disorder and illness, particularly on autism spectrum disorder and schizophrenia, we point out a significant risk of further harming an already stigmatized population. Specifically, because predictive coding is undergirded by Bayesian inference, (...)
     
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    What it Means to be Rational: An Analysis on Knowledge, Rational Deliberation, and Action.Lee Elkin - unknown
    The following thesis is an analysis on the relation between knowledge and reasoning about how to act. It seems fairly intuitive that one is rational to act on what one knows. But unfortunately, the issue is not so simple. In constructing a normative framework for practical reason, one could either require knowledge to be a necessary requirement for practical reason or one might only hold that knowledge is sufficient for reasoning about what to do, though having knowledge is not a (...)
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