Abstract

In what follows, I would like to trace Dietrich von Hildebrand’s thinking on the nature of axiological properties. Hildebrand begins his analysis from the phenomenology of what we experience as important and distinguishes three categories of importance: the subjectively satisfying, the value and the objective good of the person. He then moves on to metaphysical analysis to clarify whether the categories describe properties of objects and concludes that the foundation of all importance is value, the intrinsic preciousness. He also examines the families of values and the relations between being and value. This analysis has an important completion in the investigation of the types of oughtness, which allow us to understand the foundation of norms. Hildebrand’s value theory makes it possible to address some crucial metaphysical problems, in particular the question of whether good ultimately triumphs. The epistemological premise of Hildebrand’s perspective, however, is the thesis that man experiences not only facts, but also values.