Phenomenal conservatism and self-defeat: a reply to DePoe

Philosophical Studies 156 (1):1-13 (2010)
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Abstract

John DePoe has criticized the self-defeat argument for Phenomenal Conservatism. He argues that acquaintance, rather than appearance, may form the basis for non-inferentially justified beliefs, and that Phenomenal Conservatism conflicts with a central motivation for internalism. I explain how Phenomenal Conservatism and the self-defeat argument may survive these challenges.

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Michael Huemer
University of Colorado, Boulder

References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The structure of empirical knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
The problems of philosophy.Bertrand Russell - 1912 - New York: Barnes & Noble.
Meditations on First Philosophy.René Descartes - 1984 [1641] - Ann Arbor: Caravan Books. Edited by Stanley Tweyman.

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