Epistemic vice predicts acceptance of Covid-19 misinformation

Episteme 21 (1):207-228 (2024)
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Abstract

Why are mistaken beliefs about COVID-19 so prevalent? Political identity, education and other demographic variables explain only part of the differences between people in their susceptibility to COVID-19 misinformation. This paper focuses on another explanation: epistemic vice. Epistemic vices are character traits that interfere with acquiring, maintaining, and transmitting knowledge. If the basic assumption of vice epistemology is right, then people with epistemic vices such as indifference to the truth or rigidity in their belief structures will tend to be more susceptible to believing COVID-19 misinformation. We carried out an observational study (US adult sample, n = 998) in which we measured the level of epistemic vice of participants using a novel Epistemic Vice Scale that captures features of the current competing analyses of epistemic vice in the literature. We also asked participants questions eliciting the extent to which they subscribe to myths and misinformation about COVID-19. We find overwhelming evidence to the effect that epistemic vice is associated with susceptibility to COVID-19 misinformation. In fact, the association turns out to be stronger than with political identity, educational attainment, scores on the Cognitive Reflection Test, personality, dogmatism, and need for closure. We conclude that this offers evidence in favor of the empirical presuppositions of vice epistemology.

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Author Profiles

Mark Alfano
Macquarie University
Boudewijn de Bruin
University of Groningen

Citations of this work

Social epistemology.Alvin I. Goldman - 2001 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Social Epistemology.Cailin O'Connor, Sanford Goldberg & Alvin Goldman - 2024 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Social epistemology.Alvin Goldman - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Vice Epistemology.Quassim Cassam - 2016 - The Monist 99 (2):159-180.
Epistemic Vice and Motivation.Alessandra Tanesini - 2018 - Metaphilosophy 49 (3):350-367.
Deep Epistemic Vices.Ian James Kidd - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Research 43:43-67..

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