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Alvin I. Goldman [136]Alvin Goldman [49]Alvin Ira Goldman [4]Alvin T. Goldman [1]
Alvin L. Goldman [1]
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Alvin Goldman
Rutgers University - New Brunswick
  1. Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin Ira Goldman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press.
    So argues a leading epistemologist in this work of fundamental importance to philosophical thinking.
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  2. What is Justified Belief?Alvin Goldman - 1979 - In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 1-25.
  3. Knowledge in a Social World.Alvin Ira Goldman - 1999 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
    Knowledge in a Social World offers a philosophy for the information age. Alvin Goldman explores new frontiers by creating a thoroughgoing social epistemology, moving beyond the traditional focus on solitary knowers. Against the tides of postmodernism and social constructionism Goldman defends the integrity of truth and shows how to promote it by well-designed forms of social interaction. From science to education, from law to democracy, he shows why and how public institutions should seek knowledge-enhancing practices. The result is a bold, (...)
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  4. Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge.Alvin Goldman - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.
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  5.  99
    Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.Alvin I. Goldman - 1979 - Philosophical Review 90 (3):424-429.
  6. Knowledge in a Social World.Alvin I. Goldman - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):185-190.
    Epistemology has historically focused on individual inquirers conducting their intellectual affairs in total isolation from one another. Methodological solipsism aside, however, it is incontestable that people’s opinions are massively influenced by their community and culture, by the written and spoken words of others, both past and present. This has led recent epistemologists to pay greater attention to the social dimensions of knowledge, especially to the role of testimony as a source of justification. The aim of Knowledge in a Social World (...)
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  7. A Causal Theory of Knowing.Alvin I. Goldman - 1967 - Journal of Philosophy 64 (12):357-372.
  8.  7
    Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading.Alvin L. Goldman - 2008 - Oup Usa.
    People are minded creatures; we have thoughts, feelings and emotions. More intriguingly, we grasp our own mental states, and conduct the business of ascribing them to ourselves and others without instruction in formal psychology. How do we do this? And what are the dimensions of our grasp of the mental realm? In this book, Alvin I. Goldman explores these questions with the tools of philosophy, developmental psychology, social psychology and cognitive neuroscience. He refines an approach called simulation theory, which starts (...)
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  9. Mirror Neurons and the Simulation Theory of Mind-Reading.Vittorio Gallese & Alvin I. Goldman - 1998 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 2 (12):493-501.
    A new class of visuomotor neuron has been recently discovered in the monkey’s premotor cortex: mirror neurons. These neurons respond both when a particular action is performed by the recorded monkey and when the same action, performed by another individual, is observed. Mirror neurons appear to form a cortical system matching observation and execution of goal-related motor actions. Experimental evidence suggests that a similar matching system also exists in humans. What might be the functional role of this matching system? One (...)
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  10.  98
    Reliabilist Epistemology.Alvin Goldman & Bob Beddor - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    One of the main goals of epistemologists is to provide a substantive and explanatory account of the conditions under which a belief has some desirable epistemic status (typically, justification or knowledge). According to the reliabilist approach to epistemology, any adequate account will need to mention the reliability of the process responsible for the belief, or truth-conducive considerations more generally. Historically, one major motivation for reliabilism—and one source of its enduring interest—is its naturalistic potential. According to reliabilists, epistemic properties can be (...)
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  11. Interpretation Psychologized.Alvin I. Goldman - 1989 - Mind and Language 4 (3):161-85.
  12. Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust?Alvin I. Goldman - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):85-110.
    Mainstream epistemology is a highly theoretical and abstract enterprise. Traditional epistemologists rarely present their deliberations as critical to the practical problems of life, unless one supposes—as Hume, for example, did not—that skeptical worries should trouble us in our everyday affairs. But some issues in epistemology are both theoretically interesting and practically quite pressing. That holds of the problem to be discussed here: how laypersons should evaluate the testimony of experts and decide which of two or more rival experts is most (...)
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  13.  80
    Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and Social Sciences.Alvin I. Goldman - 1992 - Cambridge: Mass.: Mit Press.
    These essays by a major epistemologist reconfigure philosophical projects across a wide spectrum, from mind to metaphysics, from epistemology to social power. Several of Goldman's classic essays are included along with many newer writings. Together these trace and continue the development of the author's unique blend of naturalism and reliabilism.Part I defends the simulation approach to mentalistic ascription and explores the psychological mechanisms of ontological individuation. Part II shows why epistemology needs help from cognitive science - not only to evaluate (...)
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  14. Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Behaviorism 17 (2):161-164.
     
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  15. Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Synthese 79 (1):165-169.
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  16. The Psychology of Folk Psychology.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):15-28.
    The central mission of cognitive science is to reveal the real nature of the mind, however familiar or foreign that nature may be to naive preconceptions. The existence of naive conceptions is also important, however. Prescientific thought and language contain concepts of the mental, and these concepts deserve attention from cognitive science. Just as scientific psychology studies folk physics (McCloskey 1983, Hayes 1985), viz., the common understanding (or misunderstanding) of physical phenomena, so it must study folk psychology, the common understanding (...)
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  17. Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge.Alvin I. Goldman - 1976 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
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  18. In Defense of the Simulation Theory.Alvin I. Goldman - 1992 - Mind and Language 7 (1-2):104-119.
  19.  39
    Computation and Cognition: Toward a Foundation for Cognitive Science.Epistemology and Cognition.Zenon W. Pylyshyn & Alvin T. Goldman - 1988 - Philosophical Quarterly 38 (153):526-532.
  20. Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin Goldman - 1986 - Erkenntnis 34 (1):117-123.
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  21.  56
    A Materialist Theory of the Mind. [REVIEW]Alvin I. Goldman - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (22):812-818.
  22. Philosophical Intuitions: Their Target, Their Source, and Their Epistemic Status.Alvin I. Goldman - 2007 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1):1-26.
    Intuitions play a critical role in analytical philosophical activity. But do they qualify as genuine evidence for the sorts of conclusions philosophers seek? Skeptical arguments against intuitions are reviewed, and a variety of ways of trying to legitimate them are considered. A defense is offered of their evidential status by showing how their evidential status can be embedded in a naturalistic framework.
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  23. Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge.Alvin I. Goldman & Erik J. Olsson - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 19--41.
    It is a widely accepted doctrine in epistemology that knowledge has greater value than mere true belief. But although epistemologists regularly pay homage to this doctrine, evidence for it is shaky. Is it based on evidence that ordinary people on the street make evaluative comparisons of knowledge and true belief, and consistently rate the former ahead of the latter? Do they reveal such a preference by some sort of persistent choice behavior? Neither of these scenarios is observed. Rather, epistemologists come (...)
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  24. Internalism Exposed.Alvin I. Goldman - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (6):271-293.
  25. Internalism, Externalism, and the Architecture of Justification.Alvin I. Goldman - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (6):309-338.
  26. Expertise.Alvin Goldman - 2018 - Topoi 37 (1):3-10.
    This paper offers a sizeable menu of approaches to what it means to be an expert. Is it a matter of reputation within a community, or a matter of what one knows independently of reputation? An initial proposal characterizes expertise in dispositional terms—an ability to help other people get answers to difficult questions or execute difficult tasks. What cognitive states, however, ground these abilities? Do the grounds consist in “veritistic” states or in terms of evidence or justifiedness? To what extent (...)
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  27.  1
    Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and Social Sciences.Alvin I. Goldman - 1992 - International Phenomenological Society.
    These essays by a major epistemologist reconfigure philosophical projects across a wide spectrum, from mind to metaphysics, from epistemology to social power. Several of Goldman's classic essays are included along with many newer writings. Together these trace and continue the development of the author's unique blend of naturalism and reliabilism.Part I defends the simulation approach to mentalistic ascription and explores the psychological mechanisms of ontological individuation. Part II shows why epistemology needs help from cognitive science - not only to evaluate (...)
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  28. Strong and Weak Justification.Alvin I. Goldman - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:51-69.
  29. Toward a Synthesis of Reliabilism and Evidentialism? Or: Evidentialism's Troubles, Reliabilism's Rescue Package.Alvin I. Goldman - 2011 - In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press.
  30.  78
    Pathways to Knowledge: Private and Public.Alvin I. Goldman - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
    How can we know? How can we attain justified belief? These traditional questions in epistemology have inspired philosophers for centuries. Now, in this exceptional work, Alvin Goldman, distinguished scholar and leader in the fields of epistemology and mind, approaches such inquiries as legitimate methods or "pathways" to knowledge. He examines the notion of private and public knowledge, arguing for the epistemic legitimacy of private and introspective methods of gaining knowledge, yet acknowledging the equal importance of social and public mechanisms in (...)
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  31.  40
    Philosophical Explanations. [REVIEW]Alvin I. Goldman - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (1):81.
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  32.  96
    Reliabilism and Contemporary Epistemology: Essays.Alvin I. Goldman - 2012 - Oup Usa.
    This is the most up-to-date collection of essays by the leading proponent of process reliabilism, refining and clarifying that theory and critiquing its rivals. The volume features important essays on the internalism/externalism debate, epistemic value, the intuitional methodology of philosophy, and social epistemology.
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  33. A Causal Theory of Knowing.Alvin I. Goldman - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
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  34.  65
    Interpretation Psychologized.Alvin I. Goldman - 1989 - Mind and Language 4 (3):161-185.
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  35.  89
    Empathy, Mind, and Morals.Alvin I. Goldman - 1992 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 66 (3):17 - 41.
  36. Epistemic Relativism and Reasonable Disagreement.Alvin I. Goldman - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 187-215.
    I begin with some familiar conceptions of epistemic relativism. One kind of epistemic relativism is descriptive pluralism. This is the simple, non-normative thesis that many different communities, cultures, social networks, etc. endorse different epistemic systems (E-systems), i.e., different sets of norms, standards, or principles for forming beliefs and other doxastic states. Communities try to guide or regulate their members’ credence-forming habits in a variety of different, i.e., incompatible, ways. Although there may be considerable overlap across cultures in certain types of (...)
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  37.  56
    Internalism Exposed.Alvin I. Goldman - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (6):271-293.
  38. Is Social Cognition Embodied?Alvin Goldman & Frederique de Vignemont - 2009 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 13 (4):154-159.
    Theories of embodied cognition abound in the literature, but it is often unclear how to understand them. We offer several interpretations of embodiment, the most interesting being the thesis that mental representations in bodily formats (B-formats) have an important role in cognition. Potential B-formats include motoric, somatosensory, affective and interoceptive formats. The literature on mirroring and related phenomena provides support for a limited-scope version of embodied social cognition under the B-format interpretation. It is questionable, however, whether such a thesis can (...)
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  39. Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Philosophical Issues 3:271-285.
  40. Philosophical Theory and Intuitional Evidence.Alvin I. Goldman & Joel Pust - 1998 - In Michael Depaul & William Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Rowman & Littlefield.
    How can intuitions be used to validate or invalidate a philosophical theory? An intuition about a case seems to be a basic evidential source for the truth of that intuition, i.e., for the truth of the claim that a particular example is or isn’t an instance of a philosophically interesting kind, concept, or predicate. A mental‐state type is a basic evidential source only if its tokens reliably indicate the truth of their contents. The best way to account for intuitions being (...)
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  41. Simulationist Models of Face-Based Emotion Recognition.Alvin I. Goldman & Chandra Sekhar Sripada - 2005 - Cognition 94 (3):193-213.
    Recent studies of emotion mindreading reveal that for three emotions, fear, disgust, and anger, deficits in face-based recognition are paired with deficits in the production of the same emotion. What type of mindreading process would explain this pattern of paired deficits? The simulation approach and the theorizing approach are examined to determine their compatibility with the existing evidence. We conclude that the simulation approach offers the best explanation of the data. What computational steps might be used, however, in simulation-style emotion (...)
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  42. Immediate Justification and Process Reliabilism.Alvin Goldman - 2008 - In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 63--82.
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  43. Reliabilism, Veritism, and Epistemic Consequentialism.Alvin I. Goldman - 2015 - Episteme 12 (2):131-143.
    According to Selim Berker the prevalence of consequentialism in contemporary epistemology rivals its prevalence in contemporary ethics. Similarly, and more to the point, Berker finds epistemic consequentialism, epitomized by process reliabilism, to be as misguided and problematic as ethical consequentialism. This paper shows how Berker misconstrues process reliabilism and fails to pinpoint any new or substantial defects in it.
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  44. Epistemics: The Regulative Theory of Cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1978 - Journal of Philosophy 75 (10):509-523.
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  45. Consciousness, Folk Psychology, and Cognitive Science.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Consciousness and Cognition 2 (4):364-382.
    This paper supports the basic integrity of the folk psychological conception of consciousness and its importance in cognitive theorizing. Section 1 critically examines some proposed definitions of consciousness, and argues that the folk- psychological notion of phenomenal consciousness is not captured by various functional-relational definitions. Section 2 rebuts the arguments of several writers who challenge the very existence of phenomenal consciousness, or the coherence or tenability of the folk-psychological notion of awareness. Section 3 defends a significant role for phenomenal consciousness (...)
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  46. Social Epistemology:Essential Readings: Essential Readings.Alvin Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.) - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
    This volume will be of great interest to scholars and students in epistemology.
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  47. Social Epistemology.Alvin Goldman - 2008 - Critica.
  48. Reliabilism.Alvin Goldman - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Reliabilism is a general approach to epistemology that emphasizes the truth conduciveness of a belief forming process, method, or other epistemologically relevant factor. The reliability theme appears both in theories of knowledge and theories of justification. ‘Reliabilism’ is sometimes used broadly to refer to any theory of knowledge or justification that emphasizes truth getting or truth indicating properties. These include theories originally proposed under different labels, such as ‘tracking’ theories. More commonly, ‘reliabilism’ is used narrowly to refer to process reliabilism (...)
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  49.  65
    Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology.Alvin Goldman - 1992 - In Philosophical Issues. Cambridge: Mass.: Mit Press. pp. 271-285.
  50. The Internalist Conception of Justification.Alvin Goldman - 1980 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 5 (1):27-51.
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