The Epistemology of Disagreement

New York: Palgrave (2015)
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Abstract

Discovering someone disagrees with you is a common occurrence. The question of epistemic significance of disagreement concerns how discovering that another disagrees with you affects the rationality of your beliefs on that topic. This book examines the answers that have been proposed to this question, and presents and defends its own answer.

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Jonathan Matheson
University of North Florida

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