A Puzzle About Disagreement and Rationality

Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 3 (4):1-3 (2014)
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Abstract

According to Conciliationism, rationality calls for a removal of dissenting opinions – in the end, the disagreement should lead to skepticism toward the disputed proposition for all the involved parties. However, psychological data regarding group inquiry indicates that groups with dissenting members are more successful in their inquiry with respect to the disputed propositions. So, according to the psychological data, rationality calls for preserving dissent – disagreement should be embraced as a great tool for getting at true beliefs. In this paper I analyze this apparent conflict.

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Citations of this work

Logical Disagreement.Frederik J. Andersen - 2024 - Dissertation, University of St. Andrews

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References found in this work

Epistemology of disagreement: The good news.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Reflection and disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
Evident, but rationally unacceptable.Earl Conee - 1987 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (3):316 – 326.

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