Synthese 197 (7):2823-2847 (2020)

Bjørn Hallsson
University of Copenhagen
Klemens Kappel
University of Copenhagen
In this article we discuss what we call the deliberative division of epistemic labor. We present evidence that the human tendency to engage in motivated reasoning in defense of our beliefs can facilitate the occurrence of divisions of epistemic labor in deliberations among people who disagree. We further present evidence that these divisions of epistemic labor tend to promote beliefs that are better supported by the evidence. We show that promotion of these epistemic benefits stands in tension with what extant theories in epistemology take rationality to require in cases of disagreement. We argue that the epistemic benefits that result from the deliberative division of epistemic labor can provide epistemic reason to maintain confidence in cases of disagreement. We then show that the deliberative division of epistemic labor constitutes a distinct kind of epistemic dependence.
Keywords Disagreement  Motivated reasoning  Collective reasoning  Epistemic teleology  Epistemic dependence
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-018-1788-6
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References found in this work BETA

The Nature of Normativity.Ralph Wedgwood - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
Reflection and Disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.

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Citations of this work BETA

Collectivized Intellectualism.Julia Jael Smith & Benjamin Wald - 2019 - Res Philosophica 96 (2):199-227.
Motivated Reasoning and the Ethics of Belief.Jon Ellis - forthcoming - Philosophy Compass:e12828.
The Dual Erasure of Domestic Epistemic Labour.Emilia L. Wilson - 2021 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 121 (1):111-125.

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