Contempt as the absence of appraisal, not recognition, respect

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 40 (2017)
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Abstract

Gervais & Fessler’s defense of a sentiment construct for contempt captures features distinguishing the phenomenon from basic emotions and highlights the fact that it comprises a coordinated syndrome of responses. However, their conceptualization of contempt as the absence of respect equivocates. Subsequently, a “dignity” culture that prescribes respect does not thereby limit legitimate contempt in the manner the authors claim.

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Author's Profile

Michelle Mason Bizri
University of Minnesota

Citations of this work

Respect.Robin S. Dillon - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.
Two kinds of respect.Stephen L. Darwall - 1977 - Ethics 88 (1):36-49.
Contempt as a moral attitude.Michelle Mason - 2003 - Ethics 113 (2):234-272.
Respect and the Second-Person Standpoint.Stephen Darwall - 2004 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 78 (2):43 - 59.

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