Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (1):165-179 (2022)

Ivar Hannikainen
Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro
Brian Flanagan
Maynooth University
ABSTRACT Most theorists agree that our social order includes a distinctive legal dimension. A fundamental question is that of whether reference to specific legal phenomena always involves a commitment to a particular moral view. Whereas many philosophers advance the ‘positivist’ claim that any correspondence between morality and the law is just a function of political circumstance, natural law theorists insist that law is intrinsically moral. Each school claims the crucial advantage of consistency with our folk concept. Drawing on the notion of dual character concepts, we develop a set of hypotheses about the intuitive relation between a rule’s moral and legal aspects. We then report a set of studies that conflict unexpectedly with the predictions by legal positivists. Intuitively, an evil rule is not a fully-fledged instance of law.
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DOI 10.1080/00048402.2020.1833953
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References found in this work BETA

Taking Rights Seriously.Ronald Dworkin (ed.) - 1977 - Duckworth.
Law’s Empire.Ronald Dworkin - 1986 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Legal Positivism and the Moral Origins of Legal Systems.Emad Atiq - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence.

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