Abstract

The second theorem concerns issue . It says that if a certain principle of Bayesian decision theory is correct, and if a certain situation is logically possible, then some forms of 'national egoism' are false. ;There follows an examination of some of the issues raised by the two theorems. Included is a discussion of Nagel's theory of ethical viewpoints and a discussion of the relation between what is "morally preferable" and what one ought to do. ;Two theorems are proved in the final chapter. The first theorem concerns issue . It says that if a certain principle of Bayesian decision theory is correct, and if a certain situation is logically possible, then it is not a true principle that the act of allowing someone else to impose a harm is morally preferable to the act of imposing an equal harm oneself. ;The asymmetry doctrine and its variants tend to favor whichever situation is the existing situation. This tendency is brought out and we see how it can lead us to reject the asymmetry view. ;Turning to issue , an attempt is made to indicate the importance of this question in foreign policy decisions. We then consider an asymmetry doctrine which says that imposing an undeserved harm is worse than allowing even a much greater harm to occur. A popular variant of this doctrine which would permit the imposition of harm on 'innocent threats' in certain cases is also considered. However it is argued that by placing substantial moral weight on the distinction between innocent threats and innocent non-threats this variant would commit us to some very unappealing moral judgements. ;Concerning issue , it is argued that even if moral relativism is true it is not always wrong to constrain people in another society to act in the way required by our human rights standards, despite the fact that their society does not accept those standards. ;Turning to moral relativism itself, it is argued that the most influential versions of relativism are unacceptable. Some relativistic theories lead to difficulties when the person or group whose attitudes determine a moral code is unaware of certain facts. Other relativistic theories lead to difficulties when the violation of a moral principle would affect people's attitudes in such a way that, according to the relativistic theories in question, the moral principle would cease to hold. ;Concerning issue , the conclusion is reached that, given some assumptions about domestic policies, it is unjustifiable for governments like the American government to give more weight to the interests of their own country than to the interests of any foreign country. However, following Sidgwick, a distinction is drawn between that kind of 'national egoism' and a government being 'more extensively involved' in advancing its own country's welfare than any other country's. The latter practice is defended. ;Three issues are discussed in this study: If moral relativism is correct, what limits should be placed on foreign policy in the human rights area? In any case, is moral relativism correct? Should a government, in shaping policy, give more weight to the national interest of its own country than to the national interest of any foreign country? Is it just as bad, morally speaking, for a government to allow undeserved harm to befall citizens of foreign countries as it is to actively inflict undeserved harm upon such persons?