Abstract

The problem I address in this project is the defense of deontological constraints, i.e. constraints against doing wrong such as lying, breaking promises, or killing the innocent. The central moral issue at stake here is under what circumstances it is permissible for an agent to cause harm or allow harm to occur, an issue which is especially heightened in the so-called "paradoxes of deontology," where it is asked why it is, e.g., wrong to kill one innocent person in order to save five others. My argument is that deontological constraints must be grounded in the principle of not intending harm. I draw on G. E. M. Anscombe's account of intention as the explanatory principle of an action: in examining an action, we distinguish the principle on which the person acts from the foreseen but accidental consequences of her action. Deontological constraints, I conclude, can be accounted for by the principle that we may cause harm where it is merely foreseen, but we may never intend harm. I do not end up endorsing an absolutist version of deontological constraints; nonetheless I argue that we cannot make sense of our moral practices without recognizing that there is an irreducible moral duty not to intend harm