Emotions, Beliefs, and Revisions

Emotion Review 8 (3):240-249 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Emotions imply a revision of our beliefs inasmuch as they are triggered by a discrepancy between our expectancies and new situations. I will study the converse relation: how emotions, particularly recurrent emotions that reappear in similar situations in the long term, are incentives to revise not only our beliefs but also the order of priorities between their related desires. Understanding how affects can revise both beliefs—under their committing aspect—and the order of desires, implies seeing the dynamics of affects as interacting with external dynamics and the order of priorities as a weak one. These philosophical considerations shed new light on the diversity of emotions, on their different temporalities, and on the paradox of emotional sharing.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,296

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Only Reflect.Ryan Cox - 2019 - Philosophical Topics 47 (2):183-204.
The Rationality of Emotion.Robert M. Gordon - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (2):284.
The Rationality of Emotion.Ronald de Sousa, Jing-Song Ma & Vincent Shen - 1987 - Philosophy and Culture 32 (10):35-66.
Emotions as modulators of desire.Brandon Yip - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (3):855-878.
II. The Emotions and their Philosophy of Mind.Richard Wollheim - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 52:19-38.
Partial First-Person Authority: How We Know Our Own Emotions.Adam J. Andreotta - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-23.
Poetic Faith and Prosaic Concerns.Elisa Lynn Galgut - 2000 - Dissertation, Rutgers the State University of New Jersey - New Brunswick

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-02-04

Downloads
9 (#1,281,906)

6 months
50 (#92,477)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Epistemic Emotions and the Value of Truth.Laura Candiotto - 2020 - Acta Analytica 35 (4):563-577.
Epistemic Emotions: The Case of Wonder.Laura Candiotto - 2019 - Revista de Filosofia Aurora 31 (54).

Add more citations

References found in this work

The Emotions.Nico H. Frijda - 1986 - Cambridge University Press.
The emotions: a philosophical introduction.Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - 2012 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Fabrice Teroni.
Choices, Values, and Frames.Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky (eds.) - 2000 - Cambridge University Press.
On the self-regulation of behavior.Charles S. Carver - 1998 - New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Michael Scheier.

View all 35 references / Add more references