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Ryan Cox
University of Sydney
  1.  38
    Knowing Why.Ryan Cox - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (2):177-197.
    In this essay, I argue that we have a non-inferential way of knowing particular explanations of our own actions and attitudes. I begin by explicating and evaluating Nisbett and Wilson’s influential argument to the contrary. I argue that Nisbett and Wilson’s claim that we arrive at such explanations of our own actions and attitudes by inference is not adequately supported by their findings because they overlook an important alternative explanation of those findings. I explicate and defend such an alternative explanation (...)
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  2.  47
    Setiya on Consequentialism and Constraints.Ryan Cox & Matthew Hammerton - 2021 - Utilitas 33 (4):474-479.
    It is widely held that agent-neutral consequentialism is incompatible with deontic constraints. Recently, Kieran Setiya has challenged this orthodoxy by presenting a form of agent-neutral consequentialism that he claims can capture deontic constraints. In this reply, we argue against Setiya's proposal by pointing to features of deontic constraints that his account fails to capture.
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    How Why-Interrogatives Work.Ryan Cox - 2019 - Synthese 198 (5):4651-4688.
    How do why-interrogatives work? How do they express the questions they express, in the contexts in which they express them? In this essay, I argue that, at a fundamental level, why-interrogatives work just like other wh-interrogatives, particularly other adjunct wh-interrogatives, and they express the questions they express, in the contexts in which they express them, by the same means that other wh-interrogatives do. These conclusions go against a trend in recent work on why-interrogatives, which holds that they are syntactically and (...)
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    Knowledge of Moral Incapacity.Ryan Cox - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-23.
    Are the limits on what we can do, morally speaking—our “moral incapacities” as Bernard Williams calls them—imposed on us from within, by reason itself, or from without, by something other than reason? Do they perhaps have their source in the will, as opposed to reason? In this essay, I argue for a theory of moral incapacity on which our moral incapacities have their source in reason itself. The theory is defended on the grounds that it provides the best explanation of (...)
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  5.  68
    Book Note: 'New Waves in Philosophy of Action', Edited by Jes's H. Aguilar, Andrei A. Buckareff, and Keith Frankish.Ryan Cox - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):411-411.
  6. Bromberger on the Syntax of Why-Interrogatives.Ryan Cox - 2020 - Lingua 247.
    Are why-interrogatives just like other wh-interrogatives, syntactically speaking? Are they filler-gap constructions? This essay presents the case for thinking that they are. It brings together the standard arguments for thinking that they are and presents a new argument for thinking so. It then critically examines the justly influential arguments of Sylvain Bromberger for thinking that why-interrogatives are not syntactically just like other wh-interrogatives and argues that they do not establish their conclusion.
     
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  7. Constitutivism About Instrumental Desires and Introspective Belief.Ryan Cox - forthcoming - Dialectica.
    This essay is about two familiar theses in the philosophy of mind: constitutivism about instrumental desires, and constitutivism about introspective beliefs, and the arguments for and against them. Constitutivism about instrumental desire is the thesis that instrumental desires are at least partly constituted by the desires and means-end beliefs which explain them and is a thesis which has been championed most prominently by Michael Smith. Constitutivism about introspective belief is the thesis that introspective beliefs are at least partly constituted by (...)
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  8. Introspection and Distinctness.Ryan Cox - forthcoming - In A Materialist Theory of the Mind: 50 Years on. Oxford, UK:
    Claims about the distinctness or non-distinctness of introspective beliefs from the mental states they are about have played a central role in the philosophy of introspection in the past fifty years or so. In A Materialist Theory of the Mind and work leading up to it, David Armstrong famously argued against infallibilist theories of introspection, and in defence of his own self-scanning theory of introspection, on the ground that introspective beliefs are distinct from the mental states they are about. Sydney (...)
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  9.  1
    Only Reflect.Ryan Cox - 2019 - Philosophical Topics 47 (2):183-204.
    While it is widely held that normative reflection is an effective means of controlling our emotions, it has proven to be notoriously difficult to provide a plausible model of such control. How could reflection on the normative status of our emotions be a means of controlling them? Higher-order models of reflective control give a special role to higher-order beliefs and judgments about the normative status of our emotions in controlling our emotions, but in doing so claim that higher-order beliefs and (...)
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