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Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential). The unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act
Brain 106 (3):623--664 (1983)
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Citations of this work
Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action.Benjamin Libet - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):529-66.
The Phenomenology of Action: A Conceptual Framework.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2008 - Cognition 107 (1):179 - 217.
Self-supervision, normativity and the free energy principle.Jakob Hohwy - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):29-53.
Beyond the comparator model: A multi-factorial two-step account of agency.Matthis Synofzik, Gottfried Vosgerau & Albert Newen - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (1):219-239.
References found in this work
What is it Like to be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
The Experimental Evidence for Subjective Referral of a Sensory Experience Backwards in Time: Reply to P. S. Churchland.Benjamin Libet - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (June):182-197.
Brain stimulation and the threshold of conscious experience.Benjamin Libet - 1966 - In John C. Eccles (ed.), Brain and Conscious Experience: Study Week September 28 to October 4, 1964, of the Pontificia Academia Scientiarum. Springer. pp. 165--181.
Context effects and the validity of loudness scales.W. R. Garner - 1954 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 48 (3):218.
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