A testable mind-brain theory
Abstract
Proceeding from the observation by Ryle that I cannot prepare myself for the next thought that I am going to think, I argue that conscious acts cannot control my bodily motions or thoughts. This position is not compatible with indeterminism. I also argue that consciousness represents the irreducible and multi-modal output of the behavioral control system sensors necessary for the control of human behavior demonstrated by Marken . My analysis supports one experimental result obtained by Libet, Gleason, Wright, and Pearl , namely, that the initiation of a "voluntary act" is an unconscious cerebral process. I conclude that the following are not realizable: "mental intentions" acting on the supplementary motor area as postulated by Eccles and Robinson , and "veto," a conscious abort of a motor act after subjects reported "wanting to act" . These two items would seem to be amenable to test by studies similar to or refinements of Libet's