Stability and Justification in Hume’s Treatise, Another Look- A Response to Erin Kelly, Frederick Schmitt, and Michael Williams

Hume Studies 30 (2):339-404 (2004)
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Abstract

Hume’s moral philosophy is a sentiment-based view. Moral judgment is a matter of the passions; certain traits of character count as virtues or vices because of the approval or disapproval they evoke in us, feelings that express concern we have about the social effects of these traits. A sentiment-based approach is attractive, since morality seems fundamentally to involve caring for other people. Sentiment-based views, however, face a real challenge. It is clear that our affections are often particular; we favor certain persons over others. This poses a problem when it comes to determining the proper content of morality. The ties of sentiment would seem to be in tension with the aspirations of morality toward impartiality and universality.

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Erin Kelly
University of Colorado, Boulder

Citations of this work

Hume's general point of view: A two‐stage approach.Nir Ben-Moshe - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (3):431-453.
Hume's Epistemology: The State of the Question.Hsueh M. Qu - 2019 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 57 (3):301-323.
Associative Virtues and Hume's Narrow Circle.Erin Frykholm - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):612-637.
Associative Virtues and Hume's Narrow Circle.Erin Frykholm - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (4):612-637.

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