Good reasoning can lead to success; bad reasoning can lead to catastrophe. Yet, it's not obvious how we reason, and why we make mistakes. This new book by one of the pioneers of the field, Philip Johnson-Laird, looks at the mental processes that underlie our reasoning. It provides the most accessible account yet of the science of reasoning.

Millions of us increasingly seek happiness in fads and self-help books, reaching upward every day toward some enlightened state that we wish to attain. Surfing icon Laird Hamilton is more intent on looking inward and appreciating the brilliant creatures we already are. In Liferider, Laird uses five key pillars-Death & Fear, Heart, Body, Soul, and Everything Is Connected-to illustrate his unique worldview and life practices, offering inspiration to anyone who wants to elevate their ordinary, landlocked lives to do (...) extraordinary things. This is Laird Hamilton in his own words--raw, honest, and unvarnished--on topics he has rarely explored before. Based on extensive interviews and conversations between Laird and his coauthor, Julian Borra, with additional insights from Laird's wife, pro-volleyball player Gabby Reece, Liferider takes on human resilience, relationships, business, technology, risk-taking, and the importance of respecting the natural world, all through the lens of Laird's extraordinary life both in and beyond the ocean. (shrink)

An examination of the earliest creation traditions and symbols of China and their similarities to those of other ancient cultures Reveals the deep parallels between early Chinese words and those of other ancient creation traditions such as the hieroglyphics of ancient Egypt Explores the 8 stages of creation in Taoism and the cosmological origins of Chinese ancestor worship, the zodiac, the mandala, and the I Ching Provides further evidence that the cosmology of all ancient cultures arose from a single now-lost (...) source Building on his extensive research into the sacred symbols and creation myths of the Dogon of Africa and those of ancient Egypt, India, and Tibet, Laird Scranton investigates the myths, symbols, and traditions of prehistoric China, providing further evidence that the cosmology of all ancient cultures arose from a single now-lost source. Scranton explores the fundamental similarities between the language that defined ancient Chinese cosmology and that of other creation traditions, revealing the connections between the phonetic structure of the words, their glyphs, and their use. He demonstrates striking parallels between the earliest systems of writing in China and the hieroglyphs of ancient Egypt. He examines the 8 levels of creation in Taoism and the cosmological origins of Chinese ancestor worship, mythical emperors, the zodiac, the mandala, and the I Ching. He details the fundamental principles of land-use in ancient China in relation to the symbolism of a Buddhist stupa and the Dogon granary, ritual shrines that are also the central symbol of other creation traditions. Understanding the true meanings of these symbol complexes also reveals the sophisticated scientific understanding of these ancient cultures, for these creation symbols directly correlate with our modern understanding of atoms and the energetic makeup of matter. In exploring Chinese cosmological traditions, Scranton sheds new light on the contention that the sacred knowledge of the ancients is the legacy of an earlier culture who gave primitive humanity the tools they needed to birth the first known civilizations. (shrink)

Examines how the similarities of symbols and wisdom across many cultures point to an ancient civilizing plan and system of ancient instruction.

In this collection of papers by Laird Addis, published over approximately a quarter century, the main topics are the ontology of mind and the role of mind in the explanation of behavior. Addis defends a theory of natural signs, by which there is, in every conscious state including emotional states, an intrinsically intentional entity. He also argues that explanations of behavior by dispositional mental states, while not themselves causal explanations, presuppose the possibility of such explanations. The theory of dispositions (...) is applied also to the theories of Chomsky and Freud. In broad strokes, Addis holds that, while there is a distinct realm of mental properties, behaviors admit of purely physical explanations. (shrink)

Although there is a huge literature on Nietzsche s philosophy, this is the first study in English that focuses on his ontology. Before proceeding to that ontology, Addis argues that, contrary to many commentators, Nietzsche defends both the possibility and the desirability of objectivity in the search for knowledge, including knowledge of the basic features of reality, that is, of ontology. In separate chapters, Addis then sets out, analyzes, and evaluates the five essential components of Nietzsche s ontology: constant change, (...) substances and things, minds, causation, and will to power. In each case, Addis contributes an original understanding of the feature under discussion, with more detail than exists in other treatments, and defended with quotes from relevant texts of Nietzsche.". (shrink)

I argue that Aristotle’s arguments in passages regarding chance in the Physics and in passages about ignorance in action in the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics presuppose two different uses of ‘for the sake of something’, which are able to explain respectively the wish or thought of agents and the type or nature of what they actually do. In my view, however, this does not commit Aristotle, in the ‘ignorance’ passages from the two Ethics, to holding that the type or nature (...) of what the agents actually do is for the sake of killing or wounding. (shrink)

In this paper, I show that Aristotle’s refutation of the Eleatic argument in Physics I.8 is based on the idea that a thing at the starting point of coming to be is composite and is made up of what underlies and a priva­tion. In doing so, I clarify how the concept of accidentality as used in his solution should be understood in relation to the composite nature of what comes to be. I also suggest an explanation of why Aristotle’s discus­sion (...) of the Eleatic dilemma in Physics I.8, unlike his discussion in the previous chapter, is not clear. (shrink)

In Kafka’s unfinished story, The Burrow, an unidentified subterranean creature struggles while digging in a burrow, constantly engulfed in anxiety for potential intruders. His obsessive anxiety starts to be materialised in his hearing of a noise everywhere and at constant intensity. Incessantly speculating the cause of this noise, his dreadful imagination first finds it as a swarm of small fries, eventually growing into a single gigantic monster threatening his burrow, as if desiring an irresistible entity that goes beyond the idea (...) of the individual. Inspired by this story of a creature suffocating from his lonesome effort of nesting, this paper discusses how an individual sensation of dread could potentially transcend to an ability to imagine social totality, drawing on the philosophical readings of Kafka’s other character Odradek by Benjamin and Adorno. I further argue that this process is aesthetic, correlating Freud’s idea of the uncanny with Adorno’s theory of aesthetic experience which examine the negotiation between individuation and socialisation in an experience of desubjectification. By sketching out the anxious hearing in The Burrow in reference to the disturbing seeing of object-creature Odradek, I discuss the feeling of dread that marks the transformation of individual entities into a transcendent social/collective being. (shrink)

Classical embryological studies have led to the suggestion that cells in developing tissues may be directed to differentiate along a particular pathway by the concentrations of molecules called morphogens. Studies of the slime mould Dictyostelium discoideum, which has a simple tissue pattern consisting of only two cell types, have revealed several molecules which may act as morphogens. Cyclic AMP and ammonia promote the formation of spores, while adenosine and a novel class of compounds called DIFs promote the formation of stalk (...) cells, the alternative cell fate. The constant proportions of the two differentiated cell types observed in this organism may result from a balance among the influences of these compounds. (shrink)

In this study on deduction, the authors argue that people reason by imagining the relevant state of affairs, ie building an internal model of it, formulating a tentative conclusion based on this model and then searching for alternative models.

I contend that a great deal of western philosophical thought is based upon a mistaken assumption, and that is: there is something real that we can know. I argue that, on the contrary, insofar as our experience is of a world that has meaning, this experience is not of the world "as it really is," but of the world as we perceive it through language. The very process of making the world meaningful, or learning about it, is at the same (...) time a mediation of the world. ;Because the self has, for the most part, been conceived as some kind of object, in Part One I discuss the relationship between language and our experience of objects, and our experience of objects in time. In Part Two I examine the two traditional approaches to knowledge, and attempt to show that empiricism yields no knowledge of "reality" and that metaphysics is unmeaningful. I conclude that, while we cannot know what is real, we continue to desire to do so, and so continue to make the world meaningful in various ways. ;In Part Three I claim that the self is something that we cannot know--although we try to know ourselves by telling stories about ourselves to ourselves--and that all attempts to describe the self result in the creation of models. I define 'models' as broad, compelling representations of what the self is, but which are incapable of accommodating one or another obvious feature of human experience. ;In Part Four I apply all of the above to the disciplines of psychology and literary criticism. Specifically, I criticize Stanley Fish's notion of the interpretation of texts, and analyze what is called 'dissociative identity disorder' --a disorder that makes sense only on the assumption that many selves can inhabit a single body. ;Finally, in Part Five, I admit that this entire thesis is nonsense, insofar as it is an attempt to say: "This is how things are." I conclude, however, that there are greater and lesser pieces of nonsense in the world, and that the value of philosophy resides in being able to expose great nonsense as nonsense. (shrink)

This paper will argue that there is no such thing as introspective access to judgments and decisions. I t won't challenge the existence of introspective access to perceptual and imagistic states, nor to emotional feelings and bodily sensations. On the contrary, the model presented in Section 2 presumes such access. Hence introspection is here divided into two categories: introspection of propositional attitude events, on the one hand, and introspection of broadly perceptual events, on the other. I shall assume that the (...) latter exists while arguing that the fonner doesn't. Section I makes some preliminary points and distinctions, and outlines the scope of the argument. Section 2 presents and motivates the general model of introspection that predicts a divided result. Section 3 provides independent evidence for the conclusion that judgments and decisions aren't introspectable. Section 4 then replies to a number of objections to the argument, the most important of which is made from the perspective of so-called "dual systems theories" of belief formation and decision making, The upshot is a limited form of eliminativism about introspection, in respect of at least two core categories of propositional attitude. (shrink)

In this paper we investigate the locus of believability effects in syllogistic reasoning. We identify three points in the reasoning process at which such effects could occur: the initial interpretation of premises, the examination of alternative representations of them (in all of which any valid conclusion must be true), and the “filtering” of putative conclusions. The effect of beliefs at the first of these loci is well established. In this paper we report three experiments that examine whether beliefs have an (...) effect at the other two loci. In experiments 1 and 2 subjects drew their own conclusions from syllogisms that suggested believable or unbelievable ones. In the third experiment they evaluated conclusions that were presented to them. The data show that beliefs both affect the examination of alternative models and act as a filter on putative conclusions. We conclude by showing how some types of problem and some problem contents make the existence of alternative models more obvious than others. (shrink)

I Introduction In recent years there have arisen from several quarters, even within analytic philosophy itself, various challenges to the "positivist" ...

AN entity is a natural sign if by its very nature it represents some other entity or would-be entity. Many different kinds of things are said to represent other things, and in many cases it is recognized that the connection is purely conventional, in others that it is partly conventional being based in some sense on natural relations, and perhaps in yet others purely natural. My thesis is that a thought and a thought alone is, or contains as a constituent, (...) an entity that is a natural sign. This could be denied by rejecting either the existential claim or the uniqueness claim: most who deny it, which appears to be the overwhelming majority of contemporary philosophers who worry about such matters, say that there are no natural signs. As for the uniqueness claim, I shall for the moment merely register my conviction that an entity that is or contains a natural sign is necessarily a state of consciousness, and indeed the common feature of states of consciousness. (shrink)

The authors outline a theory of conditionals of the form If A then C and If A then possibly C. The 2 sorts of conditional have separate core meanings that refer to sets of possibilities. Knowledge, pragmatics, and semantics can modulate these meanings. Modulation can add information about temporal and other relations between antecedent and consequent. It can also prevent the construction of possibilities to yield 10 distinct sets of possibilities to which conditionals can refer. The mental representation of a (...) conditional normally makes explicit only the possibilities in which its antecedent is true, yielding other possibilities implicitly. Reasoners tend to focus on the explicit possibilities. The theory predicts the major phenomena of understanding and reasoning with conditionals. (shrink)

People reject ‘paradoxical’ inferences, such as: Luisa didn't play music; therefore, if Luisa played soccer, then she didn't play music. For some theorists, they are invalid for everyday conditionals, but valid in logic. The theory of mental models implies that they are valid, but unacceptable because the conclusion refers to a possibility inconsistent with the premise. Hence, individuals should accept them if the conclusions refer only to possibilities consistent with the premises: Luisa didn't play soccer; therefore, if Luisa played a (...) game then she didn't play soccer. Two experiments corroborated this prediction for three sorts of ‘paradox’, including a disjunctive paradox. (shrink)

This paper outlines a theory and computer implementation of causal meanings and reasoning. The meanings depend on possibilities, and there are four weak causal relations: A causes B, A prevents B, A allows B, and A allows not‐B, and two stronger relations of cause and prevention. Thus, A causes B corresponds to three possibilities: A and B, not‐A and B, and not‐A and not‐B, with the temporal constraint that B does not precede A; and the stronger relation conveys only the (...) first and last of these possibilities. Individuals represent these relations in mental models of what is true in the various possibilities. The theory predicts a number of phenomena, and, contrary to many accounts, it implies that the meaning of causation is not probabilistic, differs from the meaning of enabling conditions, and does not depend on causal powers or mechanisms. The theory also implies that causal deductions do not depend on schemas or rules. (shrink)

(2013). The processes of inference. Argument & Computation: Vol. 4, Formal Models of Reasoning in Cognitive Psychology, pp. 4-20. doi: 10.1080/19462166.2012.674060.

This paper reviews current psychological theories of syllogistic inference and establishes that despite their various merits they all contain deficiencies as theories of performance. It presents the results of two experiments, one using syllogisms and the other using three-term series problems, designed to elucidate how the arrangement of terms within the premises affects performance. These data are used in the construction of a theory based on the hypothesis that reasoners construct mental models of the premises, formulate informative conclusions about the (...) relations in the model, and search for alternative models that are counterexamples to these conclusions. This theory, which has been implemented in several computer programs, predicts that two principal factors should affect performance: the figure of the premises, and the number of models that they call for. These predictions were confirmed by a third experiment. Dans cet article sont passées en revue les théories psychologiques du traitement des syllogismes. On établit qu'en dépit de leurs mérites variés toutes sont en défaut en tant que théories de la performance. On présente les résultats de deux expériences, une utilisant des syllogismes et l'autre des problémes avec des séries de trois termes conçues pour élucider comment l'arrangement des termes dans les premises affecte la performance. Ces données sont utilisées pour construire une théorie fondée sur l'hypothése que les gens construisent des modèles mentaux des premises, formulent des conclusions explicites sur les relations dans le modèle et cherchent des modèles qui seraient des contre-exemples pour leurs conclusions. Cette théorie, utilisée dans plusieurs programmes d'ordinateur, prédit que deux principaux facteurs affectent la performance: la figure des premises et le nombre de; modèles qu'ils mettent en jeu. Cette prédiction est confirmée dans les trois expériences. (shrink)

Behaviorism and the philosophy of the act are widely believed to be inconsistent with one another. I argue that both are true, Fulfilling the requirements of scientific psychology and the phenomenology of mind, Respectively. The key to understanding their mutual consistency lies in the idea of parallelism and its corresponding requirement that all descriptive features of mental states be analyzed as properties, None as relations (to anything physical). So the intentional link itself must be a 'logical' and not a descriptive (...) connection. More broadly, It is required to free the act from its origins in the metaphysical notion of 'activity' and the substance ontology from which that motion derives. (shrink)

According to the theory of dispositions here defended, to have a disposition is to have some (non-dispositional) property that enters into a law of a certain form. The theory does not have the crucial difficulty of the singular material implication account of dispositions, but at the same time avoids the unfortunate notion of 'reduction sentences'. It is further argued that no dispositional explanation is one of the covering-law type; but the theory shows how, for any dispositional explanation! To construct a (...) potential explanation of the covering-law type. The theory can also be applied fruitfully to human behavior, especially with respect to the issues of reasons and causes and of' rational' explanation. The success of the applicability of this theory of dispositions is further evidence of its adequacy. (shrink)