Doxastic Obligations and the Traditional Definition of Knowledge

Dialogue 22 (2):291-298 (1983)
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Abstract

In the sixth chapter of his Theory of Knowledge Roderick Chisholm refers to an example suggested by Alexius Meinong in order to show that the traditional definition of knowledge is in need of some modification. In this paper I should like to show that Chisholm's argument rests on a mistaken assumption as to what an individual's doxastic responsibilities are.

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Peter Hess
University of Toronto, St. George Campus

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Belief, Truth and Knowledge.Peter D. Klein - 1976 - Philosophical Review 85 (2):225.

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