On the Individuation of Choice Options

Philosophy of the Social Sciences 50 (4):338-365 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Decision theorists have attempted to accommodate several violations of decision theory’s axiomatic requirements by modifying how agents’ choice options are individuated and formally represented. In recent years, prominent authors have worried that these modifications threaten to trivialize decision theory, make the theory unfalsifiable, impose overdemanding requirements on decision theorists, and hamper decision theory’s internal coherence. In this paper, I draw on leading descriptive and normative works in contemporary decision theory to address these prominent concerns. In doing so, I articulate and assess several different criteria for individuating and formally representing agents’ choice options.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,221

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

IIA, rationality, and the individuation of options.Tina Rulli & Alex Worsnip - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (1):205-221.
Decision theory and cognitive choice.John R. Welch - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (2):147-172.
On the consistency of choice.Ola Mahmoud - 2017 - Theory and Decision 83 (4):547-572.
Stochastic choice over menus.Pedram Heydari - 2020 - Theory and Decision 88 (2):257-268.
Gandalf’s solution to the Newcomb problem.Ralph Wedgwood - 2013 - Synthese 190 (14):2643–2675.
Scopes, Options, and Horizons – Key Issues in Decision Structuring.Sven Ove Hansson - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (2):259-273.
Actualist rationality.Charles F. Manski - 2011 - Theory and Decision 71 (2):195-210.

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-03-23

Downloads
66 (#221,685)

6 months
11 (#127,802)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Roberto Fumagalli
King's College London

References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. Quine - 1951 - [Longmans, Green].
The Logic of Decision.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1965 - New York, NY, USA: University of Chicago Press.
Risk and Rationality.Lara Buchak - 2013 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

View all 77 references / Add more references