Dissertation, (2017)
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Abstract |
Standard decision theory, or rational choice theory, is often interpreted to be a theory of instrumental
rationality. This dissertation argues, however, that the core requirements of orthodox decision theory
cannot be defended as general requirements of instrumental rationality. Instead, I argue that these
requirements can only be instrumentally justified to agents who have a desire to have choice dispositions
that are stable over time and across different choice contexts. Past attempts at making instrumentalist
arguments for the core requirements of decision theory fail due to a pervasive assumption in decision
theory, namely the assumption that the agent’s preferences over the objects of choice – be it outcomes
or uncertain prospects – form the standard of instrumental rationality against which the agent’s actions
are evaluated. I argue that we should instead take more basic desires to be the standard of instrumental
rationality. But unless agents have a desire to have stable choice dispositions, according to this standard,
instrumental rationality turns out to be more permissive than orthodox decision theory.
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Keywords | instrumental rationality rational choice theory expected utility theory decision theory money pump argument dynamic choice transitivity separability |
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