Reasons and Persons

Oxford University Press (1984)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Challenging, with several powerful arguments, some of our deepest beliefs about rationality, morality, and personal identity, Parfit claims that we have a false view about our own nature. It is often rational to act against our own best interersts, he argues, and most of us have moral views that are self-defeating. We often act wrongly, although we know there will be no one with serious grounds for complaint, and when we consider future generations it is very hard to avoid conclusions that most of us will find very disturbing.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 76,215

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Trivial Personal Differences.Tove Finnestad - 2001 - Philosophical Papers 30 (1):41-55.
On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
Utilitarianism and personal identity.David W. Shoemaker - 1999 - Journal of Value Inquiry 33 (2):183-199.
Should We Retire Derek Parfit?Ronald M. Green - 2011 - Hastings Center Report 41 (1):3-3.
Conservation, foresight, and the future generations problem.Steve Vanderheiden - 2006 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 49 (4):337 – 352.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
1,410 (#4,337)

6 months
90 (#10,101)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Derek Parfit
Last affiliation: Oxford University

Citations of this work

Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism.David Chalmers - 2013 - Amherst Lecture in Philosophy 8.
The epistemic significance of disagreement.Thomas Kelly - 2005 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Volume 1. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 167-196.
Games and the art of agency.C. Thi Nguyen - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (4):423-462.

View all 2406 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references