Dialogue 52 (3):587-604 (2013)

Karyn L. Freedman
University of Guelph
In this paper, I develop an interest-relative theory of justification in order to answer the question, “How can I maintain that P when someone whom I consider to be my epistemic peer maintains that not-P?” The answer to this question cannot be determined by looking at evidence alone, I argue, since justification cannot be determined by looking at evidence alone. Rather, in order to determine whether a subject S is justified in believing that P at time t, we need to assess her evidence in favour of P in proportion to her interest in P. Dans cet article, je développe sur la question de la justification une théorie reliée à l’intérêt afin de répondre à la question suivante : «comment puis-je affirmer que P quand quelqu’un que je considère comme mon homologue épistémique soutient que non-P?» Je soutiens que la réponse à cette question ne peut pas être déterminée à partir des seuls éléments de preuve, puisque la justification ne peut être déterminée en examinant les données seules. Au contraire, afin de déterminer si un sujet S est justifié à croire que P au temps t, nous devons évaluer son témoignage en faveur de P en proportion de son intérêt pour P.
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DOI 10.1017/s0012217313000681
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References found in this work BETA

Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Reflection and Disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement.Thomas Kelly - 2005 - In John Hawthorne & Tamar Gendler (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Volume 1. Oxford University Press. pp. 167-196.
Epistemological Puzzles About Disagreement.Richard Feldman - 2006 - In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press. pp. 216-236.
Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):67-94.

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