Abstract

In his later thought, Martin Heidegger disclaimed the possibility of a philosophical history of philosophy. In his view, the history of philosophy tends to remain bound to a specißc philosophical orientation and offer merely a philosophical position, not philosophy itself, presenting at best nothing more than an assemblage of doctrinal positions. In contrast, Heidegger developed in his early Freiburg lectures of 1919-1923 an historical-phenomenological program of philosophical history directed against the historical school of Dilthey, whose objekthi-storisch perspective he meant to replace with his own vollzugshistorisch method. For Heidegger, there is no perfected subject at the basis of historical investigation, but rather it is the temporality of the observer which makes possible historical knowledge in the ßrst place. Heidegger's later abandonment of this notion is a significant reason for the lack of a philosophical approach to writing the history of philosophy after 1945 in Germany.