Locke and Mind-Body Dualism

Philosophy 45 (172):87 - 105 (1970)
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Abstract

The word ‘dualism’ can be used to pick out at least four different theories concerning the relationship between mind and body. A mind and a body are two different entities and each is “had” by a man. A man is thus a composite being with two components, one “inner”, the other “outer”. You, for example, are a man and your mind is “inner” in the sense that you alone can reflectively experience yourself thinking, or feeling pain, or seeing colours . I can in a sense observe you thinking, but only by observing you use your body in certain ways—e.g. to make certain sounds, write certain things, look at the pages of an open book and frown. My “experience” of you thinking is thus not a reflective experience. Your body is “outer”, on the other hand, in the sense that you cannot experience it or its properties in any exclusive way. That is, in whatever sense you can be said to experience your body, someone else can equally be said to experience it

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Citations of this work

Locke on Substance.Han-Kyul Kim - 2021 - In Jessica Gordon-Roth & Shelley Weinberg (eds.), The Lockean Mind. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 226-236.
Locke, metaphysical dualism and property dualism1.José Luis Bermúdez - 1996 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 4 (2):223-245.

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References found in this work

The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.
A Materialist Theory of the Mind.D. Armstrong - 1968 - Philosophical Quarterly 19 (74):73-79.
Locke and the Problem of Personal Identity.Antony Flew - 1951 - Philosophy 26 (96):53 - 68.
Locke's Theory of Personal Identity: A Re-examination.Henry E. Allison - 1966 - Journal of the History of Ideas 27 (1):41.
Volition.G. N. A. Vesey - 1961 - Philosophy 36 (138):352 - 365.

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