Journal of Logic and Computation 28 (6):1099-1124 (2018)

Igor Douven
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Hans Rott
Universität Regensburg
According to the Lockean thesis, a proposition is believed just in case it is highly probable. While this thesis enjoys strong intuitive support, it is known to conflict with seemingly plausible logical constraints on our beliefs. One way out of this conflict is to make probability 1 a requirement for belief, but most have rejected this option for entailing what they see as an untenable skepticism. Recently, two new solutions to the conflict have been proposed that are alleged to be non-skeptical. We compare these proposals with each other and with the Lockean thesis, in particular with regard to the question of how much we gain by adopting any one of them instead of the probability 1 requirement, that is, of how likely it is that one believes more than the things one is fully certain of.
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References found in this work BETA

Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief.Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1961 - Middletown, CT, USA: Wesleyan University Press.
Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief.Henry Ely Kyburg - 1961 - Middletown, CT, USA: Middletown, Conn., Wesleyan University Press.
The Stability Theory of Belief.Hannes Leitgeb - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (2):131-171.

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Citations of this work BETA

Full & Partial Belief.Konstantin Genin - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 437-498.
Four Approaches to Supposition.Benjamin Eva, Ted Shear & Branden Fitelson - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
Formal Representations of Belief.Franz Huber - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Categorical Versus Graded Beliefs.Franz Dietrich - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 18.

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