Formal Representations of Belief

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2008)
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Abstract

Epistemology is the study of knowledge and justified belief. Belief is thus central to epistemology. It comes in a qualitative form, as when Sophia believes that Vienna is the capital of Austria, and a quantitative form, as when Sophia's degree of belief that Vienna is the capital of Austria is at least twice her degree of belief that tomorrow it will be sunny in Vienna. Formal epistemology, as opposed to mainstream epistemology (Hendricks 2006), is epistemology done in a formal way, that is, by employing tools from logic and mathematics. The goal of this entry is to give the reader an overview of the formal tools available to epistemologists for the representation of belief. A particular focus will be the relation between formal representations of qualitative belief and formal representations of quantitative degrees of belief.

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Franz Huber
University of Toronto, St. George Campus

Citations of this work

Being Realist about Bayes, and the Predictive Processing Theory of Mind.Matteo Colombo, Lee Elkin & Stephan Hartmann - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (1):185-220.
Beliefs do not come in degrees.Andrew Moon - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):760-778.
Imprecise Probabilities.Seamus Bradley - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Bayesian Cognitive Science, Monopoly, and Neglected Frameworks.Matteo Colombo & Stephan Hartmann - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (2):451–484.

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References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Logical foundations of probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago]: Chicago University of Chicago Press.
Laws and symmetry.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1989 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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