Dr. Truthlove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Bayesian Probabilities

Noûs 50 (4):816-853 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Many philosophers have argued that "degree of belief" or "credence" is a more fundamental state grounding belief. Many other philosophers have been skeptical about the notion of "degree of belief", and take belief to be the only meaningful notion in the vicinity. This paper shows that one can take belief to be fundamental, and ground a notion of "degree of belief" in the patterns of belief, assuming that an agent has a collection of beliefs that isn't dominated by some other collection in terms of the overall balance of truth and falsity that it could contain.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,100

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Relations with Concrete Others.D. Pettman - 2004 - Theory, Culture and Society 21 (6):137-144.
The Premodern Bible in the Postmodern World.Leander E. Keck - 1996 - Interpretation: A Journal of Bible and Theology 50 (2):130-141.
How I Learned to Keep Worrying and Love Teaching the Canon.Andrew Dilts - 2012 - philoSOPHIA: A Journal of Continental Feminism 2 (1):78-81.
Decoherence and Ontology (or: How I learned to stop worrying and love FAPP).David Wallace - 2010 - In Simon Saunders, Jon Barrett, Adrian Kent & David Wallace (eds.), Many Worlds?: Everett, Quantum Theory & Reality. Oxford University Press. pp. 53--72.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-06-20

Downloads
434 (#45,560)

6 months
58 (#80,616)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Kenny Easwaran
University of California, Irvine

Citations of this work

Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):175-211.
Bayesian Philosophy of Science.Jan Sprenger & Stephan Hartmann - 2019 - Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
Why Credences Are Not Beliefs.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):360-370.

View all 77 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.
The Logic of Decision.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1965 - New York, NY, USA: University of Chicago Press.
Risk and Rationality.Lara Buchak - 2013 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays.Frank Plumpton Ramsey - 1925 - London, England: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Edited by R. B. Braithwaite.

View all 47 references / Add more references