The Stability of Belief: How Rational Belief Coheres with Probability

Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press (2017)
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Abstract

In everyday life we either express our beliefs in all-or-nothing terms or we resort to numerical probabilities: I believe it's going to rain or my chance of winning is one in a million. The Stability of Belief develops a theory of rational belief that allows us to reason with all-or-nothing belief and numerical belief simultaneously.

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Chapters

Introduction

Chapter 1 introduces the topic of the book by discussing, first, the nature of belief, different concepts of belief, and how all-or-nothing belief and numerical degrees of belief may relate to each other metaphysically, in particular, whether belief may reduce to degrees of belief. The cha... see more

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Author's Profile

Hannes Leitgeb
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München

Citations of this work

Justification, knowledge, and normality.Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1593-1609.
Good Guesses.Kevin Dorst & Matthew Mandelkern - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (3):581-618.
On the Independence of Belief and Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - Philosophical Issues 32 (1):9-31.

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