The Cookie Paradox

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):355-377 (2014)
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Abstract

We’ve all been at parties where there's one cookie left on what was once a plate full of cookies, a cookie no one will eat simply because everyone is following a rule of etiquette, according to which you’re not supposed to eat the last cookie. Or at least we think everyone is following this rule, but maybe not. In this paper I present a new paradox, the Cookie Paradox, which is an argument that seems to prove that in any situation in which everyone is truly following the rule, no one eats any cookies at all, no matter how many there are to be eaten. The ‘Cookie Argument’ resembles the more familiar argument that surprise exams are impossible, but it's not exactly the same. I argue that the biggest difference is that, unlike the surprise exam argument, the Cookie Argument is actually sound! I conclude the paper by explaining how it could be possible for a group of people to engage in behavior (eating cookies) that guarantees that at least one of the members of the group will violate a rule, even when it's common knowledge in the group that everyone is committed to following that very rule.

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Dylan Dodd
University of California at Santa Barbara (PhD)

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References found in this work

Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 36 (3):602-605.
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Probability and the logic of rational belief.Henry Ely Kyburg - 1961 - Middletown, Conn.,: Wesleyan University Press.
Blindspots.Roy A. Sorensen - 1988 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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