Counterfactuals

Malden, Mass.: Blackwell (1973)
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Abstract

Counterfactuals is David Lewis' forceful presentation of and sustained argument for a particular view about propositions which express contrary to fact conditionals, including his famous defense of realism about possible worlds and his theory of laws of nature.

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Author's Profile

David K. Lewis
PhD: Harvard University; Last affiliation: Princeton University

Citations of this work

Epistemic Modals.Seth Yalcin - 2007 - Mind 116 (464):983-1026.
Can human irrationality be experimentally demonstrated?L. Jonathan Cohen - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):317-370.
Against Parthood.Theodore Sider - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 8:237–293.
Two concepts of causation.Ned Hall - 2004 - In John Collins, Ned Hall & Laurie Paul (eds.), Causation and Counterfactuals. MIT Press. pp. 225-276.

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