Body of knowledge and the ontology of the body

Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 2 (2) (1987)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The notion of competence in A Philosophical Basis of Medcial Practice presents a problem concerning the ontology of the body. This paper will maintain that an ontology of the body can only be based upon Cartesian grounds whereby the scientific knowable order is supposed to be identical to the natural order of things. Moral questions are not a part of this order and depend upon free will. Foucault has demonstrated that such a dualism between nature and morality cannot be warranted for contemporary medical practice. Medical science does not derive its foundation from a natural order but from the order of knowing which is present in the body of knowledge (episteme). This body of knowledge is the significative cultural force in the way of looking at problems of disease, life and death. Thus in contemporary medical practice, concepts of morality and competence which are based on notions of free will, shall be discarded as non-sensical, even for the patient.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,219

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The body as object versus the body as subject: The case of disability.Steven D. Edwards - 1998 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 1 (1):47-56.
The body in bioethics.Alastair V. Campbell - 2009 - New York: Routledge.
Sartre on the phenomenal body and Merleau-ponty's critique.M. C. Dillon - 1974 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 5 (2):144-158.
The 'medical body' as philosophy's arena.Martyn Evans - 2001 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 22 (1):17-32.
Mind-body, body-mind: Two distinct problems.Benny Shanon - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (5):697 – 701.
Feminism and the body.Londa L. Schiebinger (ed.) - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
27 (#557,528)

6 months
1 (#1,459,555)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references