The Basic Self and Its Doubles

Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (7-8):169-195 (2011)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

As Descartes noted, a proper account of the nature of the being one is begins with a basic self present in first-person experience, a self that one cannot cogently doubt being. This paper seeks to uncover such a self, first within consciousness and thinking, then within the lived or first-person felt body. After noting the lack of grounding of Merleau-Ponty’s commonly referenced reflections, it undertakes a phenomenological investigation of the body that finds the basic self to reside in one’s espoused feelings and striving, both bodily in nature. It then examines the relationship of the lived body to the visual body and to the body studied by science. Two issues concerning that relationship are taken up. It is concluded that on the available evidence neither the apparent agency nor the apparent free will of the lived body is illusory.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,783

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Illness and the paradigm of lived body.S. Kay Toombs - 1988 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 9 (2).
Lived body and environment.Shaun Gallagher - 1986 - Research in Phenomenology 16 (1):139-170.
Can I be ill and happy?Havi Carel - 2007 - Philosophia 35 (2):95-110.
The philosophy of the body.Stuart F. Spicker - 1970 - Chicago,: Quadrangle Books.
Embodied simulation: From neurons to phenomenal experience. [REVIEW]Vittorio Gallese - 2005 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (1):23-48.
The apparent truth of dualism and the uncanny body.Stephen Burwood - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):263-278.
My body as an object: self-distance and social experience.Line Ryberg Ingerslev - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):163-178.
Mind-body, body-mind: Two distinct problems.Benny Shanon - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (5):697 – 701.
A self for the body.Frédérique de Vignemont - 2011 - Metaphilosophy 42 (3):230-247.
Sensorimotor subjectivity and the enactive approach to experience.Evan Thompson - 2005 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):407-427.

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-10-11

Downloads
34 (#468,926)

6 months
3 (#969,763)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Albert A. Johnstone
University of Oregon

Citations of this work

The Deep Bodily Roots of Emotion.Albert A. Johnstone - 2012 - Husserl Studies 28 (3):179-200.
A View to a Kill: Perspectives on Faux-Snuff and Self.Steve Jones - 2016 - In N. Jackson, S. Kimber, J. Walker & T. Watson (eds.), Snuff: Real Death and Screen Media.
A View to a Kill: Perspectives on Faux-Snuff and Self.Steve Jones - 2016 - In Neil Jackson, Shaun Kimber, Johnny Walker & Thomas Watson (eds.), Snuff: Real Death and Screen Media. Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 277-294.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references