Removing an Inconsistency from Jago’s Theory of Truth

Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 30 (4):339-349 (2023)
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Abstract

I identify an inconsistency in Jago’s theory of truth. I show that Jago is committed to the identity of the proposition that the proposition that A is true and the proposition that A. I show that Jago is committed to the proposition that A being true because A if the proposition that A is true. I show that these two commitments, given the rest of Jago’s theory, entail a contradiction. I show that while the latter commitment follows from Jago’s theory of truth, even by Jago’s own lights he should not be committed to the identity of the proposition that the proposition that A is true and the proposition that A.

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References found in this work

What Truth Is.Mark Jago - 2018 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Truth without Dependence.Robert Trueman - 2022 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 96 (1):89-121.
Truthmaker account of propositions.Mark Jago - 2022 - In Chris Tillman & Adam Murray (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Propositions. Routledge.
Propositions as Truthmaker Conditions.Mark Jago - 2017 - Argumenta 2 (2):293-308.
Truth, Ascriptions of Truth, and Grounds of Truth Ascriptions.Wolfgang Künne - 2018 - In Annalisa Coliva, Paolo Leonardi & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History. Londra, Regno Unito: Palgrave. pp. 31-66.

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