Truthmaker account of propositions

In Chris Tillman & Adam Murray (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Propositions. Routledge (2022)
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Mark Jago
Nottingham University

Citations of this work

On ways of being true.Mark Jago - 2023 - Synthese 202 (1):1-16.
Removing an Inconsistency from Jago’s Theory of Truth.Nathan William Davies - 2023 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 30 (4):339-349.

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