What Truth Is

Oxford: Oxford University Press (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Mark Jago presents and defends a novel theory of what truth is, in terms of the metaphysical notion of truthmaking. This is the relation which holds between a truth and some entity in the world, in virtue of which that truth is true. By coming to an understanding of this relation, he argues, we gain better insight into the metaphysics of truth. The first part of the book discusses the property being true, and how we should understand it in terms of truthmaking. The second part focuses on truthmakers, the worldly entities which make various kinds of truths true, and how they do so. Jago argues for a metaphysics of states of affairs, which account for things having properties and standing in relations. The third part analyses the logic and metaphysics of the truthmaking relation itself, and links it to the metaphysical concept of grounding. The final part discusses consequences of the theory for language and logic. Jago shows how the theory delivers a novel and useful theory of propositions, the entities which are true or false, depending on how things are. A notable feature of this approach is that it avoids the Liar paradox and other puzzling paradoxes of truth.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 94,439

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

What Truth Is by Mark Jago. [REVIEW]Nikk Effingham - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (4):661-664.
Truthmaking.Jamin Asay - 2023 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Presentism, truthmaking, and the nature of truth.Aaron M. Griffith - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 63 (4):259-267.
True by Default.Aaron Griffith - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (1):92-109.
Truthmaking, Truth, and Realism: New Work for a Theory of Truthmakers.Jamin Asay - 2011 - Dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
What Truth Depends on.Hannes Leitgeb - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (2):155-192.
Truthmaking.Phillip Bricker - 2015 - In Barry Loewer & Jonathan Schaffer (eds.), A companion to David Lewis. Chichester, West Sussex ;: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 159–187.
Why Truthmaking Is Not a Case of Grounding.Paul Audi - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (3):567-590.
Being and Truth.Paul Horwich - 1981 - In Felicia Ackerman (ed.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. pp. 258–273.

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-05-08

Downloads
196 (#104,984)

6 months
24 (#148,008)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Mark Jago
Nottingham University

Citations of this work

Impossible Worlds.Franz Berto & Mark Jago - 2013 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Conjunctive paraconsistency.Franca D’Agostini - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6845-6874.
Knowing how things might have been.Mark Jago - 2018 - Synthese (Suppl 8):1-19.
Truthmakers.Fraser MacBride - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Deflating Deflationary Truthmaking.Jamin Asay & Sam Baron - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):1-21.

View all 18 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references