Synthese 191 (15):3649-3659 (2014)

Authors
Alexander Skiles
Rutgers University - New Brunswick
Abstract
Mark Jago has presented a dilemma for truthmaker non-maximalism—the thesis that some but not all truths require truthmakers. The dilemma arises because some truths that do not require truthmakers by the non-maximalist’s lights (e.g., that Santa Claus does not exist) are necessitated by truths that do (e.g., that Barack Obama knows that Santa Claus does not exist). According to Jago, the non-maximalist can supply a truthmaker for such a truth only by conceding the primary motivation for the view: that it allows one to avoid positing strange ‘negative’ entities without adopting a non-standard account of the necessary features of ordinary things. In this paper, I sketch out and defend two plausible non-maximalist proposals that evade Jago’s dilemma.
Keywords Truthmakers  Truthmaker non-maximalism  Metaphysical grounding  Negative existentials  Positive facts  Jago  Mellor
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s11229-014-0485-3
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction.Gideon Rosen - 2010 - In Bob Hale & Aviv Hoffmann (eds.), Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 109-135.
Truth.Paul Horwich - 1990 - Clarendon Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.

View all 33 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

True by Default.Aaron M. Griffith - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (1):92-109.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Truthmaker Non-Maximalist's Dilemma.Mark Jago - 2012 - Mind 121 (484):903-918.
The Cost of Truthmaker Maximalism.Mark Jago - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (4):460-474.
How to Be a Truthmaker Maximalist.Ross P. Cameron - 2008 - Noûs 42 (3):410 - 421.
The World and Truth About What Is Not.Noël B. Saenz - 2014 - Philosophical Quarterly 64 (254):82-98.
Truthmakers.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (2):186–200.
Unstable Truthmaking.Jamin Asay & Sam Baron - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (3):230-238.
The Hard Road to Presentism.Jamin Asay & Sam Baron - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (3):314-335.
Traditional Christian Theism and Truthmaker Maximalism.Timothy Pawl - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (1):197-218.
Priority Monism, Partiality, and Minimal Truthmakers.A. R. J. Fisher - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (2):477-491.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2014-05-05

Total views
590 ( #14,425 of 2,519,275 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
22 ( #39,167 of 2,519,275 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes