Distributed agency, responsibility and preventing grave wrongs

Contemporary Political Theory 19 (2):188-210 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Despite the theoretical uptake of ontological schemas that do not tie agency uniquely to individual humans, these new ontological geographies have had little penetration when it comes to designing institutions to prevent grave wrongs. Moreover, our persistent intuitions tie agency and responsibility to individuals within a figuration of blame. This article seeks to connect new materialist and actor network theories with the design of institutions that seek to prevent torture. It argues that although research into the causes and conditions of torture points to the inadequacy of agent-centric explanations, the preponderance of prevention interventions emphasize the role of individual human agents. New materialist and ANT approaches could afford a rich theoretical underpinning for prevention approaches by addressing the broad ecology of causal factors. Drawing on Spinoza, the article considers the affective impediments to the uptake of understandings and their correlate practices that require moving beyond agent-centric explanations for grave wrongs. So long as anger, indignation and blame colonize the individual and broader institutional spheres, they will almost inevitably bind us to a particular type of inadequate causal analysis and make other types of preventative responses appear as derelictions of our duty to hold wrongdoers responsible for their acts.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,423

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Group Agency, Responsibility, and Control.Anders Strand - 2013 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 43 (2):201-224.
Nobody’s Perfect: Moral Responsibility in Negligence.Ori Herstein - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 31 (1):109-125.
Agency as difference-making: causal foundations of moral responsibility.Johannes Himmelreich - 2015 - Dissertation, London School of Economics and Political Science
Denying Corporate Rights and Punishing Corporate Wrongs.Amy J. Sepinwall - 2015 - Business Ethics Quarterly 25 (4):517-534.
Extended cognition, personal responsibility, and relational autonomy.Mason Cash - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):645-671.
Forgiving Grave Wrongs.Alisa L. Carse & Lynne Tirrell - 2010 - In Christopher Allers & Marieke Smit (eds.), Forgiveness In Perspective. Rodopi Press. pp. 66--43.
The Moral Agency of Group Agents.Christopher Thompson - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (3):517-538.
Iv-answering for crime.R. A. Duff - 2006 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (1):87-113.
Agency and Responsibility.Pamela Hieronymi - 2022 - In Luca Ferrero (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Agency. New York, NY: Routledge.
Public Wrongs and the Criminal Law.Ambrose Y. K. Lee - 2015 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 9 (1):155-170.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-10-21

Downloads
31 (#506,316)

6 months
12 (#203,198)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Thinking, Fast and Slow.Daniel Kahneman - 2011 - New York: New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to the Actor-Network Theory.Bruno Latour - 2005 - Oxford, England and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things.Jane Bennett - 2010 - Durham: Duke University Press.
When Species Meet.Donna Jeanne Haraway - 2007 - Univ of Minnesota Press.

View all 22 references / Add more references