Utilitas 25 (3):334-54 (2013)

Authors
Stephen M. Campbell
Bentley University
Abstract
This essay introduces and defends a new analysis of prudential value. According to this analysis, what it is for something to be good for you is for that thing to contribute to the appeal or desirability of being in your position. I argue that this proposal fits well with our ways of talking about prudential value and well-being; enables promising analyses of the related concepts of luck, selfishness, self-sacrifice, and paternalism; preserves the relationship between prudential value and the attitudes of concern, love, pity, and envy; and satisfies various other desiderata. I also highlight two ways in which the analysis is informative and can lead to progress in our substantive theorizing about the good life.
Keywords Well-being  Welfare  Prudential value  Prudence  Good life  Harm  Luck  Envy  Pity  Paternalism
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Reprint years 2013
DOI 10.1017/s0953820812000581
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References found in this work BETA

Mortal Questions.[author unknown] - 1979 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 43 (3):578-578.
Normative Ethics.Shelly Kagan - 1998 - Mind 109 (434):373-377.
Desire as Belief.David Lewis - 1988 - Mind 97 (418):323-32.

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Citations of this work BETA

Against Welfare Subjectivism.Eden Lin - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):354-377.
The Experience Requirement on Well-Being.Eden Lin - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):867-886.
Anti-Meaning and Why It Matters.Stephen M. Campbell & Sven Nyholm - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (4): 694-711.

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