Utilitas 31 (2):137-156 (2019)

Joseph Van Weelden
Ahmedabad University
This article considers two different ways of formulating a desire-satisfaction theory of prudential value. The first version of the theory (the object view) assigns basic prudential value to the state of affairs that is the object of a person’s desire. The second version (the combo view) assigns basic prudential value to the compound state of affairs in which (a) a person desires some state of affairs and (b) this state of affairs obtains. My aims in this article are twofold. First, I aim to highlight that these are not mere notational variants, but in fact have quite different implications, so that this distinction is not one that the theorist of prudential value should ignore. More positively, I argue that the object view is better able to capture what is distinctive and appealing about subjective theories of prudential value, on any plausible account of what the central subjectivist insight is.
Keywords well-being, desire-satisfaction theory
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DOI 10.1017/s0953820818000237
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References found in this work BETA

Facts and Values.Peter Railton - 1986 - Philosophical Topics 14 (2):5-31.
Meta‐Ethics and the Problem of Creeping Minimalism.James Dreier - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):23–44.
Principia Ethica.George Edward Moore - 1903 - International Journal of Ethics 14 (3):377-382.

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Citations of this work BETA

Structuring Wellbeing.Christopher Frugé - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Can Subjectivism Account for Degrees of Wellbeing?Willem van der Deijl & Huub Brouwer - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (3):767-788.
Well‐Being, Part 2: Theories of Well‐Being.Eden Lin - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (2):e12813.

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