The experience requirement on well-being

Philosophical Studies 178 (3):867-886 (2020)
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Abstract

According to the experience requirement on well-being, differences in subjects’ levels of welfare or well-being require differences in the phenomenology of their experiences. I explain why the two existing arguments for this requirement are not successful. Then, I introduce a more promising argument for it: that unless we accept the requirement, we cannot plausibly explain why only sentient beings are welfare subjects. I argue, however, that because the right kind of theory of well-being can plausibly account for that apparent fact about welfare subjects even if the requirement is false, this argument does not succeed. I tentatively conclude that no compelling case can be made for the requirement.

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Eden Lin
Ohio State University

Citations of this work

Consciousness Makes Things Matter.Andrew Y. Lee - forthcoming - Philosophers' Imprint.
AI wellbeing.Simon Goldstein & Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini - 2025 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):1-22.
Sentientism, Motivation, and Philosophical Vulcans.Luke Roelofs - 2023 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 104 (2):301-323.

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References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Animal Liberation.Peter Singer (ed.) - 1977 - Avon Books.
On What Matters: Volume Three.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford University Press UK.
The Epistemic Role of Consciousness.Declan Smithies - 2019 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.

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