The communication between feelings and reason: How rational is the irrational in Plato?

History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 20 (1):32-52 (2017)
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Abstract

The focus of the paper is that for Plato all kinds of knowing, including sense perception, are acts of distinguishing something. Emotions and strivings are depending on acts of distinguishing and each part of the soul has a specific way of knowing, feeling and desiring. The thymoeides desires pleasures which arise from the judgement of individual abilities and achievements. It is related to the individual cases in which these abilities or achievements are preserved or destroyed. The close relationship between logistikon and thymoeides results from the fact that the thymoeides deals with the sphere of doxa. That’s why it is more open to rational argumentation than the epithymētikon, whose primary sphere is sense perception.

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References found in this work

Plato's ethics.Terence Irwin - 1995 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Plato's Theory of Desire.Charles H. Kahn - 1987 - Review of Metaphysics 41 (1):77 - 103.
Plato's Theory of Human Motivation.John M. Cooper - 1984 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 1 (1):3 - 21.
Appearances and Calculations: Plato's Division of the Soul.Jessica Moss - 2008 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 34:35-68.

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