Authors
Jessica Moss
New York University
Abstract
Plato links pleasure with illusion, and this link explains his rejection of the view that all desires are rational desires for the good. The Protagoras and Gorgias show connections between pleasure and illusion; the Republic develops these into a psychological theory. One part of the soul is not only prone to illusions, but also incapable of the kind of reasoning that can dispel them. Pleasure appears good; therefore this part of the soul (the appetitive part) desires pleasures qua good but ignores reasoning about what is really good. Hence the new moral psychology of the Republic: not all desires are rational, and thus virtue depends on bringing one's non-rational desires under the control of reason
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
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ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI ppr200672343
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
An Introduction to Plato's Republic.Julia Annas - 1981 - Oxford University Press.
Plato’s Ethics.Terence Irwin - 1995 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Guise of the Good.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.
Pleasure.Leonard D. Katz - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
What is Eikasia?Damien Storey - 2020 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 58:19-57.

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