John Dewey's pragmatist alternative to the belief-acceptance dichotomy

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 53:62-70 (2015)
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Abstract

Defenders of value-free science appeal to cognitive attitudes as part of a wedge strategy, to mark a distinction between science proper and the uses of science for decision-making, policy, etc. Distinctions between attitudes like belief and acceptance have played an important role in defending the value-free ideal. In this paper, I will explore John Dewey's pragmatist philosophy of science as an alternative to the philosophical framework the wedge strategy rests on. Dewey does draw significant and useful distinctions between different sorts of cognitive attitudes taken by inquirers, but none can be used to support the wedge strategy.

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Matthew J. Brown
Southern Illinois University - Carbondale

Citations of this work

Introduction: Cognitive attitudes and values in science.Daniel J. McKaughan & Kevin C. Elliott - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 53:57-61.
Trueing.Holly Andersen - 2023 - In H. K. Andersen & Sandra D. Mitchell (eds.), The Pragmatist Challenge: Pragmatist Metaphysics for Philosophy of Science. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

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References found in this work

The Will to Believe: And Other Essays in Popular Philosophy.William James - 1979 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Frederick Burkhardt, Fredson Bowers & Ignas K. Skrupskelis.
The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments.Richard Rudner - 1953 - Philosophy of Science 20 (1):1-6.
Inductive risk and values in science.Heather Douglas - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (4):559-579.
Bias and values in scientific research.Torsten Wilholt - 2009 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (1):92-101.

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