AbstractAlthough a strict dichotomy between facts and values is no longer accepted, less attention has been paid to the roles values should play in our acceptance of factual statements, or scientific descriptive claims. This paper argues that values, whether cognitive or ethical, should never preclude or direct belief on their own. Our wanting something to be true will not make it so. Instead, values should only be used to consider whether the available evidence provides sufficient warrant for a claim. This argument is made for all relevant values, including cognitive, ethical, and social values. The rational integrity of science depends not on excluding some values and including others in the reasoning process, but of constraining all values to their proper role in belief acceptance.
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References found in this work
Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry.Helen E. Longino (ed.) - 1990 - Princeton University Press.
The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays.Hilary Putnam - 2002 - Harvard University Press.
Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1977 - In The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change. University of Chicago Press. pp. 320--39.
Citations of this work
What’s so Special About Empirical Adequacy?Sindhuja Bhakthavatsalam & Nancy Cartwright - 2017 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 7 (3):445-465.
Making the Abstract Concrete: The Role of Norms and Values in Experimental Modeling.Isabelle F. Peschard & Bas C. van Fraassen - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 46:3-10.
Non-Cognitive Values and Methodological Learning in the Decision-Oriented Sciences.Oliver Todt & José Luis Luján - 2017 - Foundations of Science 22 (1):215-234.
A Verisimilitudinarian Analysis of the Linda Paradox.Gustavo Cevolani, Vincenzo Crupi & Roberto Festa - 2012 - VII Conference of the Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosphy of Science.
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