In Gyula Klima (ed.), Intentionality, Cognition and Mental Representation in Medieval Philosophy. Fordham University Press. pp. 204-234 (2015)

Authors
Susan Brower-Toland
Saint Louis University
Abstract
It is well-known that Chatton is among the earliest and most vehement critics of Ockham’s theory of judgment, but scholars have overlooked the role Chatton’s criticisms play in shaping Ockham’s final account. In this paper, I demonstrate that Ockham’s most mature treatment of judgment not only contains revisions that resolve the problems Chatton identifies in his earlier theories, but also that these revisions ultimately bring his final account of the objects of judgment surprisingly close to Chatton’s own. Even so, I argue that, at the end of the day, there remain significant differences between their respective analyses of the structure and intentionality of judicative states.
Keywords judgment, medieval, Ockham, Chatton, intentionality, mental language
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Reprint years 2015
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DOI 10.1515/9780823262779-012
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William Ockham.Marilyn McCord Adams - 1987 - University of Notre Dame Press.
Marilyn McCord Adams, William Ockham. [REVIEW]Stephen Read - 1990 - Philosophical Quarterly 40 (161):537-538.
William of Ockham: The Metamorphosis of Scholastic Discourse.Gordon Leff - 1975 - Manchester, England: Rowman & Littlefield.

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